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Abstract
Feeling concern about the suffering of others is considered a basic human response, and yet, we 
know surprisingly little about the cultural factors that shape how people respond to the suffering of 
another person. To this end, we conducted four studies that tested the hypothesis that American 
expressions of sympathy focus on the negative less and positive more than German expressions of 
sympathy, in part because Americans want to avoid negative states more than Germans do. In 
Study 1, we demonstrate that American sympathy cards contained less negative and more positive 
content than German sympathy cards. In Study 2, we show that European Americans want to 
avoid negative states more than Germans do. In Study 3, we demonstrate that these cultural 
differences in “avoided negative affect” mediate cultural differences in how comfortable 
Americans and Germans felt focusing on the negative (vs. positive) when expressing sympathy for 
the hypothetical death of an acquaintance's father. To examine whether greater avoided negative 
affect results in lesser focus on the negative and greater focus on the positive when responding to 
another person's suffering, in Study 4, American and German participants were randomly assigned 
to one of two conditions: (1) to “push negative images away” (i.e., increasing desire to avoid 
negative affect), or (2) to “pull negative images closer” to themselves (i.e., decreasing desire to 
avoid negative affect). Participants were then asked to pick a card to send to an acquaintance 
whose father had hypothetically just died. Across cultures, participants in the “push negative 
away” condition were less likely to choose sympathy cards with negative (vs. positive) content 
than were those in the “pull negative closer” condition. Together, these studies suggest that 
cultures differ in their desire to avoid negative affect, and that these differences influence the 
degree to which expressions of sympathy focus on the negative (vs. positive). We discuss the 
implications of these findings for current models of sympathy, compassion, and helping.
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Imagine that the father of one of your acquaintances just died, and you know she is 
extremely sad. You want to express your sympathy, so you decide to send her a card. But 
what type of card do you choose? Do you choose a black and white card that contains 
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phrases such as “In deep sadness,” and “Words will not lighten a heavy heart,” or a colorful 
card that contains phrases such as “Love lives on,” and “Memories will bring comfort”?
In this paper, we test the hypothesis that cultural factors shape how people express concern 
for another person's suffering. Specifically, we predict that because American culture 
encourages people to avoid negative emotion more than German culture does, American 
expressions of sympathy focus on the negative less and the positive more than German 
expressions of sympathy. We conducted four studies to test this hypothesis. Prior to 
describing the studies, we briefly review previous work on sympathy, compassion, and other 
feelings of concern about another person's suffering, and then propose how culture may 
influence expressions of sympathy based on our theoretical framework, Affect Valuation 
Theory (Tsai, 2007).
Previous Research
For decades, social scientists have been interested in the functions of sympathy and 
compassion in everyday life1 (e.g., Clark, 1997) as well as the factors that influence these 
emotions (e.g., Batson et al., 1989; Batson et al., 1991; Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973; 
Davis, 1983; Eisenberg et al., 1989; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; 
Lennon & Eisenberg, 1987; Toi & Batson, 1982). For instance, the empathy-altruism 
hypothesis originally proposed by Batson and colleagues (Batson, 1981, 1983; Batson et al., 
1991) argues that the more people feel distressed (vs. empathetic) when they see another 
person suffering, the less likely they are to help that person. In contrast, the negative state 
relief model proposed by Cialdini and colleagues (1973; 1987) argues that the more 
empathetic people feel, the sadder they feel, and people's desire to reduce this sadness leads 
them to help others. In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in sympathy, 
compassion, and other feelings of concern for another's suffering (e.g., Condon & DeSteno, 
2011; Condon & Feldman Barrett, 2013; Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010; Keltner, 
2009; Nussbaum, 1996; Oveis, Horberg, & Keltner, 2010; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2011; Van 
Kleef et al., 2008; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). However, because the vast majority of these 
studies have focused primarily on European American samples, we still know little about the 
role culture plays in shaping people's responses to another's suffering (Wuthnow, 2012, p. 
306), despite arguments that the rules and logic surrounding when to give and receive 
sympathy are culturally shaped (Clark, 1997).
The Role of Culture
Of the studies that have examined the role of culture, both cultural similarities and 
differences have been observed. Across different cultures, sympathy and compassion are 
viewed as emotions (Shaver, Murdaya, & Fraley, 2001) that can be differentiated from other 
emotions via touch (Hertenstein, Keltner, App, Bulleit, & Jaskolka, 2006), have similar 
triggers (e.g., person who is not responsible for his/her suffering) (Zhang, Xia, & Li, 2007), 
and are highly valued (Miller & Bersoff, 1994). Furthermore, cultural similarities have been 
observed in the links between experiencing sympathy/compassion and helping others (e.g., 
1Although scholars differ in their use of the terms “sympathy” and “compassion” to refer to concern for another person's suffering, for 
the purposes of this paper, we use the terms interchangeably.
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helping someone who has just lost a valued toy, or giving money to a needy stranger) 
(Eisenberg, Zhou, & Koller, 2001; Kitayama & Markus, 2000; Trommsdorff, Friedlmeier, & 
Mayer, 2007) as well as in the specific patterns of brain activity that occur during empathy 
for another person's pain (e.g., de Greck et al., 2012; Jiang, Varnum, Hou, & Han, 2014).
Differences have been observed as well. For instance, on average, people from countries 
such as Brazil and Costa Rica that value “simpatia” (being concerned about another's well-
being) and poorer nations such as Malawi and India are more likely to help a blind person, a 
person with a hurt leg, or someone who has dropped a pen (Levine, Norenzayan, & 
Philbrick, 2001) compared to people from countries that do not have a tradition of 
“simpatia” such as Singapore and Malaysia and wealthier nations such as the Netherlands 
and the U.S. Indeed, these findings are consistent with work by Stellar, Manzo, Kraus, and 
Keltner (2012) demonstrating that within the United States, individuals from lower 
socioeconomic contexts show more compassion towards a peer undergoing a stressful job 
interview than do those from higher socioeconomic contexts. Other studies suggest that 
although there are cultural similarities in the patterns of brain activity associated with 
empathizing with another person's pain, there are also differences (e.g., de Greck et al., 
2012; Jiang et al., 2014). For example, whereas Chinese participants showed a pattern of 
brain activity suggesting that they were regulating their emotions when empathizing with a 
familiar angry target, German participants showed a pattern of brain activity suggesting that 
they were assuming the perspective of the angry target (de Greck et al., 2012).
No studies, however, have examined how culture shapes the different ways in which 
sympathy, compassion, or other feelings of concern for another's suffering might be 
expressed. Previous research suggests that sympathy and compassion are mixed (i.e., 
positive and negative) feeling states (e.g., Condon & Feldman Barrett, 2013; Eisenberg et 
al., 1994); however, cultures might differ in whether expressions of sympathy focus on the 
positive (e.g., the “silver lining”) or the negative (e.g., the pain and suffering of another). 
For instance, while most people want to avoid feeling negative, cultures and individuals may 
differ in the degree to which they want to avoid negative states, which may influence how 
people express their sympathy. In cultures that encourage people to avoid negative states 
more, people may focus more on the positive and less on the negative when expressing their 
sympathy, whereas in cultures that encourage people to avoid negative states less, people 
may focus on the negative more and positive less. We test this prediction in this paper. First, 
we define “avoided affect” and then describe the theoretical framework motivating this 
work, Affect Valuation Theory (Tsai, 2007).
The Role of Avoided Negative Affect
“Verweinen lasst die Nächte mich, Solang ich weinen mag” [Let me pass the nights 
in tears, As long as I want to cry] (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe; 1749-1832)
“Be still, sad heart! And cease repining; Behind the clouds is the sun still shining” 
(Henry Wadsworth Longfellow; 1807-1882)
Feeling negative--- sad, angry, afraid, sluggish----is a part of daily human life. We are 
passed up for a job; we argue with a friend; we lose a loved one. However, as suggested by 
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the above two quotes, people differ in their responses to feeling bad. Whereas some people 
appear to accept and embrace their negative feelings, as reflected in the quote by German 
poet Goethe, others try to stop their negative emotions and focus on the positive, as reflected 
in the quote by American poet Longfellow. Although much research has focused on the 
experience of negative emotions (e.g., Brainerd, Stein, Silveira, Rohenkohl, & Reyna, 2008; 
Chorpita, Albano, & Barlow, 1998; Forgas, 2008; Frasure-Smith, Lesperance, & Talajic, 
1995; Gross et al., 1997; Gross & Levenson, 1997; Kiefer, 2005; Kuppens, Realo, & Diener, 
2008), surprisingly few studies have examined variation in the degree to which people want 
to avoid negative emotions, and the factors that account for such variation.
Instead, studies have demonstrated individual, situational, and cultural differences in 
people's attitudes toward negative emotion (e.g., Andrade & Cohen, 2007; Chambless, 
Caputo, Bright, & Gallagher, 1984; Grossmann & Kross, 2010; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-
Jones, Amodio, & Gable, 2011; Izard, 1971; Sommers, 1984; Tamir & Ford, 2009; Tamir, 
Mitchell, & Gross, 2008; Taylor & Rachman, 1991; Västfjäll & Gärling, 2006; Williams, 
Chambless, & Ahrens, 1997). However, these studies primarily focus on how much people 
dislike negative emotions rather than how much people want to avoid negative emotions. 
For example, Harmon-Jones et al. (2011) examined how much people like or dislike 
negative emotions (e.g., “I like thinking about sad things”, “I dislike how it feels when I am 
angry”). Similarly, Izard (1971) and Sommers (1984) asked their participants to report how 
much they dreaded different negative emotions (e.g., ”which emotion do you dread the 
most”; “which emotions do you dread having”), which could reflect both how much people 
dislike feeling different negative emotions as well as how much they want to avoid feeling 
negative emotions. Previous research illustrates the differences between liking and wanting 
(e.g., Dai, Brendl, & Ariely, 2010), differences that extend to disliking and avoiding as well. 
For example, while someone might not like feeling sad, she might still want to feel sad (i.e., 
not want to avoid it) because she believes that feeling sad will allow her to come to a deeper 
understanding of herself. Although disliking negative emotions and wanting to avoid 
negative emotions are both important topics of study, we were interested in the latter 
because we thought that it would influence how people respond to another's suffering. 
Although some scholars have examined the avoidance of emotions in general (Hayes et al., 
2004; Maio & Esses, 2001), none have examined the desire to avoid negative emotions 
specifically.
Affect Valuation Theory
In Affect Valuation Theory (AVT; Tsai, 2007; Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006), we proposed 
that: (1) the affective states that people actually feel (their “actual affect”) is different from 
the affective states that people ideally want to feel (their “ideal affect”), (2) cultural factors 
shape ideal affect more than actual affect, and temperamental factors shape actual affect 
more than ideal affect, and (3) ideal affect shapes what people do to feel good, as well as 
their conceptions of health and happiness. Because most people want to feel good, research 
on ideal affect has primarily focused on positive states (Tsai, 2007; Tsai et al., 2006; Tsai, 
Louie, Chen, & Uchida, 2007; Tsai, Miao, & Seppala, 2007; Tsai, Miao, Seppala, Fung, & 
Yeung, 2007). However, here we were interested in the negative states that people want to 
avoid, and therefore, we briefly discuss how AVT may apply to “avoided affect.”2
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The affective states that people want to avoid feeling (their “avoided affect”) should differ 
from their actual and ideal affect. Whereas ideal affect is a desired state, one that people 
consciously or unconsciously actively work to achieve, avoided affect is an undesired state, 
one that people consciously or unconsciously actively work to stay away from or elude. 
Both are different from actual affect, which is a response to an event or an outcome. In the 
same way that on average, people do not feel how they want to feel, reflecting a mismatch 
between actual and ideal affect (e.g., having less fun at a party than one wished), we predict 
that people may often feel how they do not want to feel, reflecting a mismatch between 
actual and avoided affect (e.g., getting angry at a friend or loved one).
We also predict that cultural factors shape avoided affect more than actual affect. Rozin 
(2003) and Shweder (2003) argue that cultural factors shape what people view as good, 
moral, and virtuous. In AVT, we applied this idea to affective states; i.e., cultural factors 
shape what affective states people view as good, moral, and virtuous. Similarly, culture 
should shape the affective states that people view as bad, immoral, and sinful. Indeed, 
previous research has documented cultural differences in undesirable states (Eid & Diener, 
2001; Izard, 1971; Sommers, 1984). For example, Eid and Diener (2001) found that people 
in individualistic cultures viewed “guilt” as more undesirable than people in collectivistic 
cultures. Although cultural factors also shape what affective states people actually feel 
(Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000; Mesquita & Markus, 2004), decades of empirical 
research suggest that across cultures, actual affect is also shaped by people's temperament 
(Costa & McCrae, 1980; David, Green, Martin, & Suls, 1997; Diener & Lucas, 1999; Gross, 
Sutton, & Ketelaar, 1998; Lykken & Tellegen, 1996; McCrae, Costa, & Yik, 1996; Rusting 
& Larsen, 1997; Schimmack, Radhakrishnan, Oishi, Dzokoto, & Ahadi, 2002) as well as 
their immediate circumstances and regulatory abilities (e.g., Gross, 1998). Thus, we predict 
that cultural factors should shape avoided affect more than actual affect.
Finally, AVT predicts that avoided affect should influence how people respond to various 
negative events, including another person's suffering, above and beyond actual affect. If 
people want to avoid negative states to a great extent, they likely try to avoid people, places, 
and events that elicit negative emotion (e.g., by trying not to run into an irritable colleague, 
by not walking home late at night, or by deciding not to see a movie with disturbing 
content). These attempts, however, may be unsuccessful (e.g., people cannot avoid the 
irritable colleague, late nights in the office, or unexpected content of films). Under those 
circumstances, avoided affect should predict how people respond to and cope with the 
experience of negative emotion. For instance, in response to the death of a loved one, the 
more individuals want to avoid negative affect, the less they may focus on the negative and 
the more they may focus on the “silver lining,” or the positive aspects of a negative event 
(e.g., by thinking of the beautiful memories they have of their loved ones) and try to “cease 
repining” (e.g., by engaging in pleasant activities and encouraging others to do the same). 
Conversely, the less people want to avoid feeling negative, the less they may focus on the 
positive and the more they might focus on the negative (e.g., by acknowledging how painful 
2Of course, there may be specific situations in which avoided affect includes positive states. For example, people might try to avoid 
excitement initially about an opportunity they have received in order to not be disappointed later. But we propose (and observe) that in 
general, people want to avoid negative more than positive affective states.
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it is to lose a loved one) and try to “pass the night in tears” (e.g., by allowing oneself to 
grieve and encouraging others to do the same). We predict that these different responses to 
and expressions of concern for others’ suffering are driven by how much people want to 
avoid negative affect above and beyond how much they actually experience negative affect 
(as suggested by some models of helping). The present study is the first to test these 
predictions, and in doing so, to expand AVT to negative states.
American vs. German Cultural Contexts
Most research on emotion in cultural and cross-cultural psychology, including our own 
previous work, has focused on differences between East Asian and Western cultures, and 
has attributed observed differences to individualism-collectivism. Much less work has 
focused on variation across different individualistic Western cultures (e.g., American vs. 
German). The few studies that have do find important variation; for instance, American and 
German cultures differ in their value priorities: while Americans give higher priority to 
“mastery” values such as achievement and controlling the environment than Western 
Europeans (including Germans), Western Europeans give higher priority to “harmony” 
values such as fitting into the environment than Americans (Schwartz & Ros, 1995). 
Furthermore, American and German cultures differ in their display rules of negative 
emotions (Koopmann-Holm & Matsumoto, 2011). For instance, the expression of anger and 
sadness is more acceptable in German than in American contexts. We were particularly 
interested in comparing Americans and Germans because ethnographic, historical, and 
personal accounts suggest that Americans want to avoid negative emotions more than 
Germans do. For instance, German scholar Hedderich (1999) conducted semi-structured 
interviews with American and German employees (from four American and four German 
companies), who had spent at least six months in the other country. He asked them about 
differences between the cultures and concluded that Americans resist talking about their 
failures, indirectly referring to them as ‘items for improvement’ (Hedderich, 1999, p. 161) 
and instead, praise each other for their achievements. Consistent with this observation, in 
“American Cool,” historian Peter Stearns (1994) states that in American society, “fear and 
anger had no positive function [...]; rather than being directed, they were to be avoided as 
fully as possible” (p. 96). Indeed, American culture considers “negativity, complaining, 
pessimism” sinful (Held & Bohart, 2002, p. 961).
Similarly, McAdams (2004) describes the key feature of contemporary American identity as 
“the transformation of personal suffering into positive-affective life scenes that serve to 
redeem and justify one's life” (p. 96), as reflected in American stories, which 
characteristically have positive endings. Positive endings are also found in American 
personal accounts of trial and tribulation. For instance, “Chicken Soup for the Soul: The 
Cancer Book” contains “101 Stories of Courage, Support and Love” (Canfield, Hansen, & 
Tabatsky, 2009), implying that even in the face of a life-threatening illness such as cancer, 
Americans can and should focus on the positive (Ehrenreich, 2009). This may be why some 
cancer survivors, including cyclist Lance Armstrong, refer to cancer as “the best thing that 
ever happened” to them (Henneberger, 2013). Indeed, as described in her book, “Bright-
Sided: How positivity thinking is undermining America,” when American Ehrenreich (2009) 
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publically expressed her anger and anxiety about having breast cancer, other breast cancer 
patients admonished her and suggested she seek psychological help.
In contrast, Germans openly and explicitly state when something is bad; for instance, many 
of the respondents in Hedderich's study (1999) commented that Germans are more likely to 
use the phrase, “das war Mist,” or “that was rubbish,” when something bad happened, 
compared to Americans. Unlike American personal accounts of illness, German accounts 
primarily focus on the negative. For instance, in his book about his battle with cancer 
entitled “Ein Jahr Hölle [One year of hell],” German actor Michael Lesch primarily 
described the anxiety and horror of having cancer, and even years later, talked about cancer 
as mainly being a horrible experience (Lesch, 2008). Indeed, German culture is often 
described as being melancholic and pessimistic, as the terms “Weltschmerz” and “Angst” 
suggest (Clair, 2005; Gelfert, 2005) and as reflected by the “Sturm und Drang” [“Storm and 
Drive”] movement in German literature and music in the 18th century, in which negative 
emotions were not just accepted, but glorified.
Why might American and German contexts differ in their desire to avoid negative affect? 
One possible explanation is that these differences stem from the historical origins of the 
United States. Although ancestors from both countries originated in Europe, the founding 
fathers of the United States left Europe to escape religious persecution, famine, and financial 
hardship (Brooks, 2004; Wilson, 2008). In essence, these individuals responded to their 
negative life circumstances by dreaming of a “brighter future” in the New World, and by 
leaving their European homelands to realize that dream (Brooks, 2004; Wilson, 2008). 
According to the “voluntary settlement hypothesis” (e.g., Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, 
& Ramaswamy, 2006; Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, & Uskul, 2009), the traits and 
values of these early settlers became the basis of American independence and individualism 
(Lipset, 1997; Wilson, 2008). Several scholars have referred to these traits as the “frontier 
spirit” (“American Frontier” Spirit; Turner, 1921), which included not only a desire to 
escape one's negative circumstances to achieve one's dreams but also a willingness to tame 
and master the wilderness of the New World in order to do so (Conway, Houck, & Gornick, 
2014). In his book, “The Frontier Spirit and Progress,” historian Tucker (1980) defined 
frontiers as “those areas in which men are most dynamically in motion to master the 
environment” (p. 4).
Thus, by leaving Europe and moving to the United States, the early settlers of the United 
States may have created a culture in which individuals want to avoid the negative and seek 
the positive. In contrast, the ancestors of modern Germany (and other parts of Europe) chose 
to stay in their European homelands. Although they may have stayed for many reasons, one 
possibility is that instead of dreaming of a new life, they responded to economic and 
religious hardship by accepting and adjusting to their negative life circumstances. Moreover, 
they may have preferred their current---albeit imperfect---life circumstances to the idea of 
crossing a vast ocean and then taming the wilderness of the New World. Thus, these 
individuals may have been part of or may have created a culture in which individuals are 
more accepting of the negative, and therefore, have less of a desire to avoid negative 
emotion. Indeed, a frontier spirit might explain why there are few differences between the 
US and Germany on the broad dimensions of individualism-collectivism but many 
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differences in specific “individualistic” values such as self-enhancement (e.g., achievement) 
and specific “collectivistic” values such as self-transcendence (e.g., fitting into nature) (e.g., 
Koopmann-Holm & Matsumoto, 2011; Schwartz & Ros, 1995).
In sum, we predicted that contemporary American culture wants to avoid negative states 
more than contemporary German culture in part because American culture endorses a 
frontier spirit (i.e., achieving one's goals, influencing one's circumstances, overcoming 
nature) more than German culture does. Although not the main focus of this paper, we begin 
to test this hypothesis in Study 3. Many sociologists and historians have written about the 
frontier spirit and its links to independence and individualism (e.g., Lipset, 1997; Tucker, 
1980; Turner, 1921; Wilson, 2008). Additionally, empirical studies have tested these ideas 
(e.g., Kitayama et al., 2006; Kitayama et al., 2009; Varnum, 2013, 2014; Varnum & 
Kitayama, 2011). For instance, one empirical study found that positive emotions were more 
independent and less interdependent among Japanese living in the frontier of Hokkaido 
compared to those living in mainland Japan (Kitayama et al., 2006). In the present study, we 
examine whether differences in the endorsement of specific values associated with the 
frontier spirit (achievement and fitting into nature) are related to differences in views of 
negative emotion between the United States and Germany. By comparing views of negative 
emotion in American and German contexts, this work significantly broadens the current 
literature on emotion across cultures, which has primarily compared North American and 
East Asian contexts.
Overview of Studies
The present studies examined whether cultural differences in expressions of sympathy exist, 
and if they do, whether cultural differences in the desire to avoid negative affect can explain 
these differences. Study 1 examined whether American sympathy cards focus less on the 
negative and more on the positive compared to German sympathy cards. Study 2 examined 
whether avoided affect is distinct from actual affect and ideal affect, and then examined 
whether Americans want to avoid negative affect more than do Germans. As described by 
circumplex/dimensional models of emotion, negative states vary in terms of arousal 
(Russell, 1980; Russell, Lewicka, & Niit, 1989). Therefore, in Study 2, we sampled high 
arousal negative (e.g., fearful, hostile, nervous), low arousal negative (e.g., dull, sleepy, 
sluggish), and moderate arousal negative (e.g., sad, unhappy, lonely) states to examine 
whether differences in actual, ideal, and avoided affect held for different types of negative 
states. Study 3 then examined whether these cultural differences in avoided negative affect 
mediated cultural differences in expressions of sympathy among Americans and Germans in 
a hypothetical scenario. In Study 3, we also examined whether cultural differences in 
avoided negative affect were due to cultural differences in specific frontier values. Finally, 
in Study 4, we experimentally manipulated avoided negative affect in American and German 
samples to assess whether we could alter the degree to which people focused on the negative 
(vs. positive) when expressing sympathy for another's suffering in a hypothetical scenario.
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Study 1: Cultural Differences in Emotional Content of Popular Sympathy 
Cards
To begin to examine whether Americans and Germans differ in how they respond to the 
suffering of another person, we compared the content of American and German sympathy 
cards. Various studies have examined the content of “cultural products” (e.g., newspapers, 
books, television, advertisements, architecture, laws, websites), or widely-distributed objects 
that both reflect and reinforce cultural ideas (e.g., Han & Shavitt, 1994; Lamoreaux & 
Morling, 2012; Markus, Uchida, Omoregie, Townsend, & Kitayama, 2006; Morling & 
Lamoreaux, 2008; Tsai, Louie, et al., 2007; Tsai, Miao, & Seppala, 2007). Indeed, Morling 
and Lamoreaux (2008) argue that in some cases, examining the content of widely distributed 
products is an even better way of illustrating dominant ideas and practices because these 
products are typically marketed to a general public, and therefore, target culturally shared 
ideas. This is in contrast to responses to questionnaire measures, for example, which 
typically reflect a combination of shared (e.g., culture) and unique (e.g., temperament) 
influences.
Moreover, because these cultural products are widely distributed, members of a culture learn 
how to think and feel by being exposed to them. For example, in previous work examining 
cultural differences in ideal affect, our lab compared the emotional content of best-selling 
American and Taiwanese children's storybooks and observed that American storybooks 
contained characters with more excited and fewer calm smiles. We then showed that being 
exposed to storybooks that promoted either excitement or calm altered children's affective 
preferences assessed immediately after (Tsai, Louie, et al., 2007).
In the present study, we focused on sympathy cards because in American and German 
contexts, sympathy cards are designed to show one's sympathy and compassion toward 
someone who has lost a loved one, and to help the receiver cope with his or her pain. In both 
cultures, the cards are widely distributed and therefore readily available. Moreover, 
Americans and Germans are regularly exposed to these cards because they are sold in a 
variety of stores. Finally, because cards are a consumer product like storybooks and 
magazines, we assumed that when people purchase the cards, they are expressing a 
preference for the type of emotions conveyed in the cards, which we predict is shaped at 
least partially by one's cultural values.
In addition to examining American and German sympathy cards, as a control comparison, 
we compared the emotional content of American and German “baby cards,” or cards sent 
when a friend or acquaintance has just had a baby. We chose baby cards as a control 
comparison because like sympathy cards, baby cards are sent in response to a significant 
emotional event in someone's life. However, compared to the death of a loved one, the birth 
of a baby is typically viewed as a positive event, and therefore, we predicted that cards sent 
in response to the birth of a baby should not be as influenced by the degree to which a 
culture encourages people to avoid feeling negative as cards sent in response to the death of 
a loved one.
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Hypotheses
We predicted that: (1) American sympathy cards would contain less negative (i.e., fewer 
words related to sadness and death, lesser acknowledgment of suffering and grief, less dying 
imagery) and more positive (i.e., more words related to positive feelings and optimism, more 
encouragement, and more living imagery) content than would German sympathy cards, and 
(2) cultural differences in the emotional content of sympathy cards would be greater than 
that of baby cards.
Method
Card Selection—In order to select a representative sample of sympathy and baby cards 
that are widely distributed in American and German contexts, we first asked 28 European 
American (67.86% female; mean age = 19.00, SD = 1.12) and 22 German undergraduate 
students (81.82% female; mean age = 21.95, SD = 1.53) from large top-tier universities in 
the US and Germany to list the top three places they would go to purchase a sympathy card 
if they wanted to send one to a friend or acquaintance who had just lost a loved one. We 
determined how often each store was mentioned as well as whether the store was mentioned 
first, second, or third (for more information, please contact the first author). European 
American participants most often mentioned Hallmark, CVS, Target, and Walmart (Target 
and Walmart were tied). German participants most often mentioned Kaufhof, 
“Buchhandlung” (German for “bookstore”), and “Schreibwarenladen” (German for 
“stationary store”).
Most of the American cards that the American stores carried were sold by Hallmark and 
American Greetings (including its greeting card brands, Carlton Cards and Papyrus), and 
most of the German cards that the German stores carried were sold by bsb, Taurus, 
Hallmark, and Hanra. We first contacted these companies for a complete catalogue of their 
cards. In Germany, bsb and Taurus provided their entire catalogues; Hallmark provided a 
random selection of their cards (cards in their on-line catalogue were not sold in stores), and 
Hanra provided some cards and suggested that we obtained the others from their website 
(cards in their on-line catalogue were the same as those sold in stores). This process 
produced a total of 376 German (246 sympathy, 130 baby) cards.
In the US, Hallmark and American Greetings said that they did not have their entire 
catalogues and suggested that we purchase the cards at various stores. Therefore, we went to 
a total of five stores (2 Hallmark, 2 Target, 2 CVS Pharmacy, and 1 Walmart) in California 
and purchased all the sympathy and baby cards they carried. This process produced 338 
American (198 sympathy, 140 baby) cards. 3
3In an ideal world, we would have used similar methods to select the cards. Indeed, we had originally tried to obtain the full 
catalogues of the most popular card companies in the US and Germany. However, while the German card companies provided their 
full catalogues, the American card companies would not and instead suggested that we go to their stores, which they said contained 
the full inventory. Although we could have gone to German stores to select the cards, it was less clear whether the German stores had 
the full inventory of cards (as American stores did). Therefore, we decided it was better to use different approaches to arrive at the 
same end----obtaining a full inventory of the cards—than to use the same approach to arrive at different ends----a full inventory in one 
culture, and an incomplete inventory in the other.
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Card Coding
Frequency of negative and positive word use (Percentage of total words that were 
positive or negative): We used the English version of the Linguistic Inquiry and Word 
Count Program (LIWC; Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) to code the text of the 
American and German sympathy and baby cards.4 A research assistant fluent in English and 
German translated the content of the German cards into English, and another research 
assistant also fluent in English and German back-translated these English translations into 
German to ensure equivalence. Both translators were blind to the study hypotheses. The few 
discrepancies that arose were discussed, and modifications were made to the original 
translation to arrive at the best possible English translation of the German text. Then we ran 
the text of the American and German cards through the English version of LIWC. LIWC 
calculates the total number of words, and then calculates the percentage of total words that 
fall into a given category. To assess the frequency of negative words, we added the 
percentages of total words that fell into the LIWC categories of “Sadness or depression” 
(e.g., grief, cry, sad) and “Death and dying” (e.g., dead, burial, coffin). To assess the 
frequency of positive words, we added the percentages of total words that fell into the 
categories “Positive feelings” (e.g., happy, joy, love) and “Optimism and energy” (certainty, 
pride, win).
Context of word use: While the types of words that occur in the cards are important, so is 
the context or way in which each word is used. For instance, the experience of sadness can 
be encouraged and acknowledged (“take time to grieve”) or discouraged (“we hope time will 
take your grief away”). Therefore, in addition to the LIWC analyses, two trained research 
assistants (different individuals than those who did the translations-back translations 
described above), one European American female (who was fluent in English and German 
and who had lived in the US most of her life) and one German female (who was fluent in 
German and English and who had lived in Germany most of her life) coded the sympathy 
cards in their original languages to determine whether the text on the card encouraged/
acknowledged grief (0 = no, 1 = yes) and whether the text on the card encouraged/wished 
something positive (0 = no, 1 = yes). For instance, the phrases “In deep sadness,” “Sharing 
your sorrow,” “We mourn the loss” were coded as encouraging/acknowledging grief, and 
“May you find comfort,” “The memories are yours,” and “Hold on to hope” were coded as 
encouraging/wishing something positive. Both coders were blind to study hypotheses. To 
assess reliability, coders overlapped on 18% of the cards (79 sympathy cards). Inter-rater 
reliability was high according to Landis and Koch (1977) (Cohen's kappa for encouraged/
acknowledged grief = .73, Cohen's kappa for encouraged/wished something positive = .74).
Card Images: The coders (who were the same as the ones who coded the context of word 
use) also coded the images on the sympathy cards in terms of whether they were living or 
dying. If there was only one image on the card, that image was coded. If there was more 
4We used the 2001 version of the LIWC internal dictionary because, unlike the 2007 version, the 2001 version includes two positive 
emotion categories (“positive feelings” and “optimism and energy”). Although these categories were eliminated from the 2007 version 
because they were rarely used in empirical studies, they are still valid (J. Pennebaker, personal communication, May 29, 2013). These 
two categories nicely parallel the categories “sadness or depression” and “death and dying,” which can be found in both the 2001 and 
2007 dictionary version and that are central to our hypotheses.
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than one image on the card, the coders coded the most prominent image. Images on the 
cards were coded as: (1) dying (e.g., shriveled leaves), (2) living (e.g., living flower), or (3) 
neutral (e.g., rocks, water). Again, inter-rater reliability was high according to Landis and 
Koch (1977) (Cohen's kappa = .69).
Data Analyses and Results
We first examined whether the sympathy cards differed in number of words they contained. 
We conducted a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) by Culture (US, Germany) on 
word count, which we obtained from LIWC. The American sympathy cards contained 
significantly more words than the German sympathy cards (American mean = 39.10, SE = 
1.39; German mean = 10.32, SE = 1.25; F[1, 442] = 237.38, p < .001, partial eta squared = .
35). For analyses of frequencies of negative and positive words, we did not control for 
number of words since these measures were percentage scores, and therefore already took 
number of words into account. However, for the analyses of context codes (which are based 
on occurrences), we controlled for the number of words in the cards (our findings did not 
differ when we did not control for number of words in the cards).
With one exception (for German cards, the correlation between context code of encouraged/
acknowledged grief and LIWC coded sadness/death was .86), the correlations among the 
variables were generally weak to moderate across cultures, with a mean of .03 (SD = .17) for 
European Americans and with a mean of .14 (SD = .38) for Germans, suggesting that the 
codes were non-overlapping. Thus, we concluded that most of the codes referred to different 
aspects of the cards and therefore should be analyzed separately.
Do American Sympathy Cards Contain Less Negative and More Positive 
Content Than German Sympathy Cards?
Frequency of Negative and Positive Words (LIWC) (Percentage of total words that 
were positive or negative): To examine whether the American and German cards differ in 
the frequency of negative and positive words (based on LIWC) described above, we 
conducted a 2 (Culture: American, German) × 2 (Card Type: Sympathy, Baby) × 2 
(Valence: negative LIWC category, positive LIWC category) repeated measures ANOVA 
with Culture and Card Type as between-group factors and Valence as within-group factor. 
We found a significant main effect for Valence (F[1, 710] = 11.14, p = .001, partial eta 
squared = .02), which was qualified by significant Valence by Culture (F[1, 710] = 10.87, p 
= .001, partial eta squared = .02), Valence by Card Type (F[1, 710] = 81.32, p < .001, partial 
eta squared = .10), and Valence by Culture by Card Type (F[1, 710] = 13.42, p < .001, 
partial eta squared = .02) interactions.
As predicted and depicted in Figure 1, simple effects analyses revealed that American 
sympathy cards contained fewer negative words (American mean = 2.90, SE = .79; German 
mean = 7.30, SE = .71), F(1, 710) = 17.35, p < .001, partial eta squared = .02) and more 
positive words (American mean = 3.50, SE = .33; German mean = 1.35, SE = .30), F(1, 710) 
= 23.51, p < .001, partial eta squared = .03, than did German sympathy cards. However, 
American and German baby cards did not differ in the frequency of negative (American 
mean = .04, SE = .94; German mean = .08, SE = .97; F[1, 710] = .001, p = .98, partial eta 
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squared < .001) or positive (American mean = 5.68, SE = .39; German mean = 6.07, SE = .
41; F[1, 710] = .47, p = .50, partial eta squared = .001) words.5
Context of Word Use: Based on the manual coding, we examined whether there were 
cultural differences in (1) encouraged/acknowledged grief, and (2) encouraged/wished 
something positive in the sympathy cards. We conducted two logistic regression analyses in 
which these two variables were regressed onto culture and number of words. As predicted, 
the American sympathy cards were less likely to encourage/acknowledge grief, B = −.76, SE 
= .38, p = .046, Nagelkerke R square = .06, and were more likely to encourage/wish 
something positive, B = 2.56, SE = .30, p < .001, Nagelkerke R square = .57, compared to 
the German cards.
Sympathy Card Images: A chi-square test of independence of the relationship between 
culture and images revealed that American and German sympathy cards differed in the type 
of images on the cards, χ2 [2, 444] = 50.44, p < .001, Cramer's V = .34. Even though a large 
percentage of the American (31.31%) and German sympathy cards (48.78%) were decorated 
with images other than dying or living ones, as predicted, significantly fewer American than 
German cards contained dying images (2.53% of American cards vs. 16.26% of German 
cards). In contrast, more American cards (66.16%) than German cards (34.96%) contained 
living images, χ2 [1, 262] = 36.23, p < .001, Cramer's V = .37.
Study 1 Summary and Discussion
As predicted, American sympathy cards contained less negative and more positive content 
than German sympathy cards. These cultural differences emerged when we examined the 
text (both the frequency of negative and positive word use and context in which negative 
and positive words were used) as well as the images on the cards. Cultural differences in the 
frequency of positive and negative words (based on LIWC) did not generalize to baby cards, 
suggesting that they may be specific to primarily negative events, such as the death of a 
loved one.6 While the frequency of positive and negative emotion words in the sympathy 
cards may appear low, they are well within the range of frequencies reported in the 43 
studies listed in the LIWC manual (Pennebaker et al., 2001).
How can these differences in sympathy card content be explained? We hypothesized that 
these differences are due at least in part to cultural differences in the desire to avoid negative 
affect. Therefore, in Study 2, we examined whether Americans and Germans indeed differ in 
the degree to which they want to avoid negative emotion. However, before examining 
cultural differences in avoided negative affect, we assessed whether avoided negative affect 
is a separate construct from actual negative affect and ideal negative affect (i.e., we wanted 
5Because the dependent variables were not normally distributed, we conducted Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U Tests and 
found similar results.
6As mentioned by one reviewer, it is interesting that American and German cultures both respond to having a baby in primarily a 
positive way, even though some aspects of having a baby are often experienced as negative by parents (e.g., lack of sleep, loss of 
independence). This may be because when celebrating the birth of a child, both Americans and Germans assume that the parents 
wished for and chose to have the child, whereas when mourning the death of a loved one, they assume the opposite: i.e., that the 
mourners did not wish for or choose to lose their loved one. In future work, it would be interesting to examine whether people's 
responses to positive and negative events varies as a function of the perceived controllability of the event.
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to make sure that avoided negative affect is not just the opposite of ideal negative affect), 
and whether people want to avoid negative states more than they ideally want to or actually 
feel them, as predicted by Affect Valuation Theory (Tsai, 2007). Because most of our 
previous work has focused on global actual and ideal affect (i.e., affective states experienced 
or desired on average or over the course of a typical week), we focused on global avoided 
affect in this study. We also sampled negative states that varied in terms of high and low 
arousal, in order to assess whether our findings differed as a function of the type of negative 
affect.
Study 2: Cultural Differences in Avoided Negative Affect Hypotheses
We predicted that: (1) avoided negative affect, ideal negative affect, and actual negative 
affect are distinct factors, and that this distinction holds in American and German contexts, 
(2) across groups, people want to avoid negative states more than they ideally want to or 
actually feel them, and (3) European Americans want to avoid feeling negative more than 
Germans do, controlling for how much they actually experience negative states.7
Method
Participants—One hundred nineteen European American (73.95% female) students and 
104 German students (81.73% female) participated in this study. There were no group 
differences in gender (χ2 [1, 223] = 1.93, p = .17, Cramer's V = .09). However, Germans 
were significantly older (mean age = 23.71, SD = 4.61) than European Americans (mean age 
= 20.22, SD = 4.47), F (1, 221) = 32.89, p < .001, partial eta squared = .13. Therefore, we 
included age in the analyses described below when it emerged as significant covariate. 
American participants received a $10 Amazon gift certificate, and German participants 
received a Euro 7 Amazon gift certificate as compensation for their participation.
Instruments
Assessment of Actual, Ideal, and Avoided Affect: To assess actual and ideal affect, 
participants completed the Affect Valuation Index (AVI; Tsai & Knutson, 2006). 
Participants used a five-point scale ranging from 1 (“never”) to 5 (“all the time”) to rate how 
often they actually felt and how often they ideally wanted to feel 37 different affective states 
that sampled each octant of the affective circumplex (high-arousal positive [HAP; elated, 
enthusiastic, euphoric], positive [P; content, happy, satisfied], low-arousal positive [LAP; 
peaceful, calm, relaxed], high-arousal negative [HAN; fearful, hostile, nervous], negative 
[N; sad, unhappy, lonely], low-arousal negative [LAN; dull, sleepy, sluggish], high-arousal 
[HA; astonished, surprised], and low-arousal [LA; idle, passive, inactive]) (Russell, 1980; 
Russell et al., 1989) over the course of a typical week. The other affective states sampled 
were excited, strong, fatigued, angry, activated, rested, quiet, still, contemptuous, guilty, 
stressed, disgusted, ashamed, and serene8. To assess avoided affect, participants used the 
7Throughout the studies presented here, we also assessed the degree to which participants wanted to feel positive states (“ideal 
positive affect”) and actually felt positive states (“actual positive affect”). However, none of the cultural differences in responses to 
suffering were mediated by ideal or actual positive affect, suggesting again that ideal positive affect and avoided negative affect are 
distinct constructs.
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same rating scale to indicate how often they wanted to avoid feeling the same states over the 
course of a typical week. Reliabilities are reported below.
Demographic Questionnaire: Participants completed a demographics questionnaire, which 
assessed participants’ gender, age, place of birth, and cultural upbringing.
Procedure—Participants were recruited via email announcements and flyers distributed at 
large top-tier universities in the US and Germany. European American participants 
completed all measures in English, and German participants completed all measures in 
German. Standard translation-back-translation procedures were used. A research assistant 
fluent in both German and English translated all scales into German. B. K.-H. (also fluent in 
German and English) then back-translated these German translations into English. The few 
discrepancies that emerged were discussed and modifications were made to the original 
translations to arrive at the best possible translation. All participants completed the measures 
online. The order of the ideal, actual, and avoided versions of the AVI was counterbalanced. 
Because the order of these measures did not have an effect on the results, we will not discuss 
it further. Other measures were included in the study as fillers.
Data Analyses and Results
Given group differences in age, we included age as a covariate. For parsimony, we retained 
age in the model when it was a significant covariate and removed it when it was not.
Hypothesis 1: Is Avoided Negative Affect Different From Actual and Ideal 
Negative Affect?9—We were first interested in whether among the negative states, 
avoided affect was distinct from actual and ideal affect, and if so, whether we would see this 
differentiation among high arousal negative (HAN), negative (N), and low arousal negative 
(LAN) states (see above). To test Hypothesis 1, we conducted confirmatory factor analyses 
using AMOS 21. We included three items from each of the negative octants (HAN: fearful, 
hostile, nervous; N: sad, unhappy, lonely; and LAN: dull, sleepy, sluggish) for avoided, 
ideal, and actual affect, and treated each as indicators for the three latent variables of ideal, 
actual, and avoided negative affect.
We hypothesized a model (see Figure 2) that included nine separate latent variables (avoided 
HAN, N, and LAN; ideal HAN, N, and LAN; and actual HAN, N, and LAN) and three 
second-order factors (the first combining avoided HAN, N, and LAN into an overall avoided 
negative factor, the second combining ideal HAN, N, and LAN into an overall ideal negative 
factor, and the third combining actual HAN, N, and LAN into an overall actual negative 
factor). In the model, we allowed these three second-order factors to covary with each other. 
Thus, our model included 3 covariance links. Across both groups, the confirmatory factor 
8We used “euphoric” rather than “excited” for the HAP composite because the German translation for “excited” is more negative than 
the English word. Similarly, we used “peaceful” instead of “serene” for the LAP composite because this yielded higher internal 
consistencies.
9To assess whether avoided affect was distinct from other related constructs, participants also completed the general regulatory focus 
measure, which includes prevention focus (GRFM; Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002), the Attitudes Toward Emotions Scale (ATE; 
Harmon-Jones et al., 2011) and the Need For Affect Scale (Maio & Esses, 2001). Correlations between these measures and ours were 
not significant (for European Americans: −.05 to .17; for Germans: −.11 to .10), demonstrating the discriminant validity of our 
measure of avoided negative affect.
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analysis testing this model revealed that the data fit the model well, χ2(312, N = 223) = 
573.34, p < .001; the root mean square of error approximation (RMSEA) = .06, with 
confidence interval .05 to .07; and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) = 759.34. The 
covariance links between the second-order avoided negative and ideal negative factors (−.
03, p = .049), between the second order avoided negative and actual negative factors (−.02, 
p = .44), and between the second order ideal negative and actual negative factors (.04, p = .
001) were small to moderate.
To test whether the constructs of ideal and avoided negative affect overlap, we constrained 
the covariance link between ideal and avoided negative affect to be −1. Across both groups, 
this constrained model had a significantly worse fit than the unconstrained model, χ2(313, N 
= 223) = 775.98, p < .001; the RMSEA = .08, with confidence interval .07 to .09; and the 
AIC = 959.98, Δχ2 = 202.64, Δdf = 1, p < .001. We also tested whether the constructs of 
actual and avoided negative affect overlap. To do this, we constrained the covariance link 
between actual and avoided negative affect to be −1. Across both groups, this constrained 
model had a significantly worse fit than the unconstrained model, χ2(313, N = 223) = 
725.48, p < .001; the RMSEA = .08, with confidence interval .07 to .08; and the AIC = 
909.48, Δχ2 = 152.14, Δdf = 1, p < .001.
In sum, these findings suggest that consistent with Hypothesis 1, avoided negative affect is 
weakly if at all correlated with actual negative affect and ideal negative affect, and all three 
types of affect are distinct constructs at both the second-order level (i.e., across all negative 
states) and at the first-order level (i.e., for each type of negative affect).
Does This Structure Hold Across Groups?—Before we can compare psychological 
constructs across different groups, we have to demonstrate measurement equivalence (Little, 
1997). In order to examine whether the model described above held for European Americans 
and Germans (i.e., all measurement weights are the same across both groups), we performed 
a multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis using AMOS 21 (e.g., Cheung & Rensvold, 
1999). All path coefficients were free to vary across the two groups. This unconstrained 
model had a good fit, χ2(624, N = 223) = 1020.08, p < .001; the RMSEA = .05, with 
confidence interval .05 to .06; and the AIC = 1392.08. Then all measurement weights were 
fixed to be the same across both groups. This fully constrained model provided a 
significantly worse fit than the unconstrained model, χ2(642, N = 223) = 1056.19, p < .001; 
the RMSEA = .05, with confidence interval .05 to .06; and the AIC = 1392.19, Δχ2 = 36.11, 
Δdf = 18, p = .01. Further analysis revealed that the path between the indicator variable ideal 
hostile and the latent variable ideal HAN varied across cultural groups. When we 
unconstrained this weight, and fixed all the other measurement weights to be the same 
across both groups, we found that this constrained model did not provide a significantly 
worse fit than the unconstrained model, χ2(641, N = 223) = 1046.43, p < .001; the RMSEA 
= .05, with confidence interval .05 to .06; and the AIC = 1384.43, Δχ2 = 26.35, Δdf = 17, p 
= .07. This suggests that consistent with Hypothesis 1, our proposed model holds for 
European Americans and Germans, except for the link between ideal hostile and ideal HAN 
affect. Ideal hostile was related to ideal HAN and overall ideal negative affect in the 
European American (estimate = 1.92, p = .003) but not in the German sample (estimate = .
33, p = .06). However, the two constructs that we primarily focused on in the present 
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studies, avoided negative and actual negative affect, had the same structure for both 
European Americans and Germans. As we did not find measurement equivalence for the 
ideal HAN composite, in the subsequent analyses, we only use this composite when we 
examine the cultural groups separately. Together, these findings suggest that the structure of 
avoided and actual negative affect is empirically valid and equivalent across American and 
German contexts.
Mean Aggregates: Correlations and Internal Consistency Estimates—Mean 
aggregate scores were computed for items that sampled each negative octant of the affective 
circumplex. For European Americans, Cronbach's alpha's ranged from .64 to .80 for actual 
negative affect, from .60 to .66 for ideal negative affect, and from .76 to .92 for avoided 
negative affect. For Germans, it ranged from .69 to .84 for actual negative affect, from .43 
to .69 for ideal negative affect, and from .76 to .88 for avoided negative affect.
Calculating mean deviated scores: European Americans had a lower overall mean 
response to all actual affect items (American mean = 2.47, SE = .02; German mean = 2.81, 
SE = .03; F(1, 221) = 94.70, p < .001, partial eta squared = .30) and to all ideal affect items 
(European American mean = 2.44, SE = .02; German mean = 2.62, SE = .02; F(1, 220) = 
42.56, p < .001, partial eta squared = .16) than did Germans. However, European Americans 
had a higher overall mean response to all avoided affect items (European American mean = 
2.91, SE = .05; German mean = 2.54, SE = .06; F(1, 219) = 22.53, p < .001, partial eta 
squared = .09) than did Germans. This is in line with previous observations of American-
German differences in response-style (e.g., Koopmann-Holm & Matsumoto, 2011).
Because of these cultural differences in response style and previous findings showing that 
people differ in how much they want to avoid feeling emotions in general (e.g., Maio & 
Esses, 2001), we mean deviated participants’ responses by subtracting each individual's 
overall mean response to all the 37 avoided affect items from the raw score for each avoided 
affect item (e.g., sad), and then calculated the mean aggregate for each type of avoided 
negative affect (HAN, N, and LAN) (e.g., for avoided HAN, we calculated the mean of 
mean deviated avoided fearful, avoided hostile, avoided nervous). We followed the same 
procedure for actual and ideal negative affect. We used these scores for avoided, actual, and 
ideal negative affect in all subsequent analyses.10 Correlations among actual, ideal, and 
avoided negative affect ranged from −.35 (p < .001) to .64 (p < .001) for European 
Americans and from −.32 (p = .001) to .42 (p < .001) for Germans.11
Hypothesis 2: Do People Want To Avoid Negative States More Than They 
Ideally Want to and Actually Feel Them?—To test Hypothesis 2 that people want to 
avoid negative states more than they ideally want to or actually feel them, we conducted 
pairwise t-tests on avoided HAN, N, and LAN with ideal HAN, N, and LAN as well as with 
10In previous work coming from our lab, we ipsatized the AVI scores (i.e., divided the mean deviated scores by the standard deviation 
across all items). Instead of ipsatization, we chose to use mean deviation in order to be able to use the same scores for all analyses 
reported in the present paper, including correlational analyses, for which ipsatized scores are not recommended. We also ran our 
analyses using the raw data, and the results were very similar.
11We also examined the correlations between avoided negative (HAN, N, and LAN) and ideal positive (HAP, P, and LAP) affect. For 
European Americans, they ranged from r(119) = .01, p = .91 to r(119) = .28, p = .002. For Germans, they ranged from r(102) = .001, p 
= .995 to r(102) = .14, p = .16.
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actual HAN, N, and LAN affect for Americans and Germans separately. We also compared 
the means of ideal HAN, N, and LAN with actual HAN, N, and LAN. All means statistically 
differed from each other, p < .001. As Figure 3 shows, European Americans (top graph) and 
Germans (bottom graph) wanted to avoid HAN, N, and LAN states more than they ideally 
wanted to feel or actually felt them. These findings support the above findings that actual 
negative affect, ideal negative affect, and avoided negative affect are distinct constructs. For 
the rest of the paper, we focus on avoided and actual negative affect; however, we ran all of 
the analyses controlling for ideal negative affect to ensure that the results were not due to 
ideal negative affect. The pattern of our findings did not change, and therefore, we do not 
discuss ideal negative affect further.
Hypothesis 3: Do Americans Want to Avoid Feeling Negative More Than Do 
Germans?—We initially ran our analyses with Gender as a between subjects factor; 
however, because there were no significant main effects or interactions involving Gender, 
we dropped Gender from our final analyses. We controlled for actual affect when examining 
group differences in avoided affect, and we controlled for avoided affect when examining 
group differences in actual affect to determine the independent effects of group on each type 
of affect. The findings did not change when we excluded these covariates.
To test Hypothesis 3 that European Americans want to avoid feeling negative states more 
than Germans do, we conducted a 2 × 2 × 3 (Group: European Americans, Germans × 
Affect Type: Avoided Affect, Actual Affect × Octant: HAN, N, LAN) repeated measures 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with Group as between-subjects factor and Affect Type 
and Octant as within-subjects factors, controlling for age. The Group by Affect Type 
interaction was significant, F(1, 218) = 14.54, p < .001, partial eta squared = .06 as well as 
the Group by Affect Type by Octant interaction, F(1.82, 397.65) = 5.55, p = .01, partial eta 
squared = .03. Consequently, for avoided and actual affect, we conducted separate 
ANCOVAs for avoided and actual negative affect for each of the three different octants. 
More specifically, we conducted three separate ANCOVAs on avoided HAN, N, and LAN, 
with Group (European Americans, Germans) as the independent variable, controlling for 
actual HAN, N, and LAN, respectively, and age when it emerged as a significant covariate. 
As predicted and depicted in Figure 4 (left), European Americans wanted to avoid HAN, N, 
and LAN states significantly more than did Germans (HAN: European American mean = 
1.31, SE = .06; German mean = .97, SE = .07, F(1, 217) = 13.62, p < .001, partial eta 
squared = .06; N: European American mean = 1.27, SE = .07, German mean = .91, SE = .07, 
F(1, 218) = 12.10, p = .001, partial eta squared = .05; LAN: European American mean = 
1.15, SE = .05, German mean = .95, SE = .06, F(1, 219) = 5.68, p = .02, partial eta squared 
= .03).
We also examined group differences in actual negative affect. We conducted ANCOVAs on 
actual HAN, N, and LAN separately with group as the independent variable, controlling for 
avoided HAN, N, and LAN, respectively and age when it emerged as a significant covariate. 
As depicted in Figure 4 (right), European Americans and Germans did not differ in how 
much they actually felt HAN (European American mean = −.46, SE = .05; German mean = 
−.34, SE = .05; F[1, 217] = 2.45, p = .12, partial eta squared = .01) or LAN (European 
American mean = .12, SE = .06; German mean = −.01, SE = .06; F[1, 219] = 2.35, p = .13, 
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partial eta squared = .01). Although European Americans (marginal mean = −.23, SE = .06) 
actually felt N states significantly less than did Germans (marginal mean = −.05, SE = .06), 
F (1, 219) = 4.07, p = .045, partial eta squared = .02, the effect size of the cultural difference 
in actual N was smaller than that of the cultural differences in avoided N, HAN, and LAN.
Study 2 Summary
As predicted, our results suggest that (1) avoided negative affect, ideal negative affect, and 
actual negative affect are distinct constructs, and that this holds for European Americans and 
Germans, (2) across groups, people want to avoid negative states more than they ideally 
want to or actually feel them, and (3) European Americans want to avoid feeling negative 
more than do Germans, even after controlling for actual negative affect. Furthermore, while 
we found cultural differences for all three negative octants of avoided affect, we only found 
cultural differences for one out of the three negative octants of actual affect. This suggests 
that consistent with AVT and our predictions, culture shapes avoided affect more than actual 
affect.
In Study 1, we established that there are cultural differences in expressions of sympathy, and 
in Study 2, we demonstrated that there are cultural differences in the desire to avoid negative 
affect. In Study 3, we examined whether there was a direct link between how much people 
want to avoid negative affect and the degree to which their expressions of sympathy focused 
on the negative (vs. positive). In addition, we also examined whether cultural differences in 
avoided negative affect were due to differences in the endorsement of specific frontier 
values.
Study 3: Do Cultural Differences in Avoided Negative Affect Mediate 
Cultural Differences in Expressions of Sympathy?
In Study 3, participants completed measures of avoided affect, and then were asked to rate 
and choose between sympathy cards that either focused more on the negative or more on the 
positive. Because Study 2 revealed that European Americans wanted to avoid HAN, LAN, 
and N states more than did Germans, for parsimony, in Study 3, we collapsed across the 
three types of negative affect and created a general avoided negative affect score.12
Hypotheses
We predicted that: (1) European Americans would report feeling less comfortable sending 
sympathy cards that focus on the negative and more comfortable sending sympathy cards 
that focus on the positive compared to Germans, (2) European Americans would report 
wanting to avoid feeling negative more than would Germans, (3) cultural differences in 
avoided negative affect would mediate the cultural differences in ratings of negative and 
positive sympathy cards, and (4) cultural differences in avoided negative affect would be 
mediated by frontier values (i.e., the more individuals value achievement, influencing their 
environments, and overcoming nature, the more they would report wanting to avoid negative 
affect).
12The pattern of results for each of the negative octants (LAN, N, HAN) was the same.
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Method
Participants—Ninety-seven European American students and 93 German students 
participated in this two-part online study. European Americans were born, raised, and had 
lived most of their lives in the US and had parents who were both of European descent. 
Germans were born, raised, and had lived most of their lives in Germany, and had parents 
who were both of German descent. The two groups differed in gender distribution 
(European American: 63.92% female; German: 82.61% female, χ2 [1, 189] = 8.37, p = .004, 
Cramer's V = .21) and age, with the German sample being more female and older (mean age 
= 24.00, SE = .33) than the European American sample (mean age = 22.18, SE = .32), F(1, 
186) = 15.97, p < .001, partial eta squared = .08. In our initial analyses, we included gender 
and age as covariates; however, because the findings were similar to when they were not 
included as covariates, we dropped them from our final analyses. Participants received an 
$8/Euro 6 Amazon gift certificate as compensation for completing the first part and another 
$12/Euro 10 Amazon gift certificate for completing the second part of the online study.
Procedure—Participants were recruited via email announcements for a two-part “emotions 
and consumer products study” at large top-tier universities in the US and Germany. All 
measures of interest were administered in the first part of the survey. European American 
participants completed all measures in English, and German participants completed all 
measures in German. The same translation-back-translation procedures as in Study 2 were 
used to ensure equivalence of the measures. All participants completed the measures online 
at home.
Instruments
Actual and Avoided Affect: As in Study 2, to assess actual and avoided affect, participants 
completed the AVI. As in Study 2, compared to Germans, Americans had a lower overall 
mean response to all actual affect items (American mean = 2.37, SE = .02; German mean = 
2.82, SE = .02; F(1, 187) = 185.50, p < .001, partial eta squared = .50), but a higher overall 
mean response to all avoided affect items (American mean = 3.02, SE = .05; German mean 
= 2.78, SE = .05; F(1, 186) = 10.11, p = .002, partial eta squared = .05). Therefore, as in 
Study 2, we mean-deviated actual and avoided negative affect scores. As stated above, for 
parsimony, we collapsed across the specific types of negative affect (HAN, LAN, N) 
because group differences emerged for all three type of negative affect in Study 2. Thus, we 
computed mean aggregate scores for the negative items (sad, unhappy, lonely, fearful, 
hostile, nervous, dull, sleepy, and sluggish). Internal consistencies (Cronbach's alphas) for 
actual and avoided negative affect were .77, and .93 for Americans and .80, and .90 for 
Germans, respectively.
Cultural values: Participants completed the 57-item version of the Schwartz Value Survey 
(SVS; Schwartz, 1992). Participants were presented a list of 57 values; for each value, 
participants used a 9-point scale ranging from −1 (“opposed to my values”) to 7 (“of 
supreme importance”) to indicate how important each value was to them. To derive an 
overall frontier value score, we first aggregated responses to “successful (achieving goals),” 
“capable (competent, effective, efficient),” “ambitious (hardworking, aspiring),” “influential 
(having an impact on people and events),” and “intelligent (logical, thinking)” to derive an 
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“achievement value score” based on Schwartz (2012) (Cronbach's alpha = .74 for European 
Americans, .72 for Germans). We then aggregated responses to “unity with nature (fitting 
into nature)” and “protecting the environment (preserving nature),” to derive a “fitting into 
nature value score”, which we viewed as the opposite of a willingness to overcome and 
master nature (Conway et al., 2014) (Cronbach's alpha =.85 for European Americans, .74 for 
Germans). Because we wanted to capture how much people value achievement compared to 
how much they value fitting into nature, we then subtracted the “fitting into nature” value 
score from the “achievement” value score to create an overall frontier value score. This 
difference score reflects the relative strength of both values, an approach used by Kitayama 
et al. (2009) in the context of independence and interdependence.
Rating of Sympathy Cards: To assess expressions of sympathy, we created three pairs of 
cards based on the American and German sympathy cards in Study 1. Each pair contained 
one card that focused on the negative more, and one that focused on the positive more. We 
created cards (available upon request) that could be found in both cultures, and therefore, 
were more negative and less positive than most American cards and less negative and more 
positive than most German cards. Participants saw the three pairs successively, first rating 
each card in the pair and then choosing one of the cards from each pair. For each pair, the 
text on the cards was matched in length, overall theme (e.g., nature), and card images so that 
the cards mainly differed in their affective content. For instance, a negative card read “A 
severe loss... take time to grieve” and a positive card read “Remembering... let time heal 
your soul.” We counterbalanced the order of the cards within each pair (while the order of 
the pairs themselves always remained the same), and we switched the background images on 
the covers of the cards within each pair. Because the order of the cards as well as the 
different background images did not influence our findings, we will not discuss them 
further.
Participants read the following instruction: “Please imagine that the father of one of your 
acquaintances just died, and you would like to send a card to this acquaintance. Please look 
at the cards below and rate how comfortable you would feel sending each card to your 
acquaintance.” Then participants saw one pair of sympathy cards. Participants made their 
ratings on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (“extremely uncomfortable”) to 5 (“extremely 
comfortable”) immediately after they saw each card in each pair. After participants rated 
both cards, participants were asked, “If you had to choose between the two cards above, 
which card would you send to your acquaintance?” Participants did the same for the second 
and third pairs of cards.
Although we created the cards, participants may have heard the phrases on the cards or seen 
the images on the cards before. Because familiarity increases liking (Zajonc, 2001), we 
asked participants to indicate whether or not they had seen any of the images or heard any of 
the phrases on the cards before. 3.09% of American and 3.23% of German participants 
reported being familiar with all three card pairs, and therefore, we excluded these 
participants from the analyses (these percentages did not differ between the two countries, χ2 
(1, 190) = .003, p = .96, Cramer's V = .004).
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We calculated the average comfort rating of the three negative cards and the average 
comfort rating of the three positive cards for each participant. Internal consistencies 
(Cronbach's alphas) for these aggregates of the three negative and three positive cards were .
29 and .69 for Americans and .59 and .57 for Germans, respectively. The very low value (.
29) for Americans’ aggregate for the negative cards reflects the restricted variance of the 
ratings in the American sample.
Demographic Questionnaire: Finally, participants completed a demographics 
questionnaire, which asked for participants’ gender, age, ethnicity, place of birth and 
upbringing, as well as their parents’ and grandparents’ ethnicities. Because religiosity and 
belief in an afterlife might influence the type of sympathy cards people feel most 
comfortable sending (e.g., people may be more positive if they think that the deceased is 
going to heaven), participants also indicated how religious they were on an eight-point scale 
ranging from 0 (“not at all”) to 7 (“very religious”) and whether or not they believed in life 
after death. There were no cultural differences in these variables, and therefore, we do not 
discuss them further.
Study 3 Analyses and Results
Hypothesis 1: Do Americans and Germans Differ in Their Rating and Choice of Sympathy 
Cards?
To test Hypothesis 1, we conducted a 2 × 2 (Group: European Americans, Germans × 
Valence: mean rating of negative cards, mean rating of positive cards) repeated measures 
ANOVA with Group as between-subjects factor and Valence as within-subjects factor. 
There was a significant main effect of Valence (F [1, 181] = 92.40, p < .001, partial eta 
squared = .34), but this was qualified by a significant Group × Valence interaction (F [1, 
181] = 32.86, p < .001, partial eta squared = .15). As predicted, simple effects analyses 
revealed that Americans felt less comfortable sending the negative cards (Americans: Mean 
= 2.05, SE = .08; Germans: Mean = 2.64, SE = .08; F [1, 181] = 25.00, p < .001, partial eta 
squared = .12) and more comfortable sending the positive cards than did Germans 
(Americans: Mean = 3.22, SE = .10; Germans: Mean = 2.94, SE = .10; F [1, 181] = 4.00, p 
= .047, partial eta squared = .02), as illustrated in Figure 5a. Although both European 
Americans and Germans felt more comfortable sending the positive than the negative cards, 
this difference was much larger for European Americans than Germans (European 
Americans: F [1, 181] = 121.04, p < .001, partial eta squared = .40; Germans: F [1, 181] = 
7.33, p = .01, partial eta squared = .04, respectively).
We also examined whether there were cultural differences in the percentage of participants 
who chose at least one out of three negative cards. Among Americans, only 36.56% chose at 
least one negative card from the three pairs, whereas among the Germans, 72.22% did, χ2 (1, 
183) = 23.43, p < .001, Cramer's V = .36.
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Hypothesis 2: Do Americans and Germans Differ in How Much They Want To Avoid 
Feeling Negative?
To test Hypothesis 2, we conducted a 2 × 2 (Group: European Americans, German × Affect 
Type: Avoided Affect, Actual Affect) repeated measures ANCOVA with Group as between-
subjects factor and Affect Type as within-subjects factor. The Group by Affect Type 
interaction was significant, F(1, 181) = 13.38, p < .001, partial eta squared = .07. 
Consequently, we conducted a univariate ANCOVA by Group (European Americans, 
Germans) for avoided negative affect, controlling for actual negative affect. As predicted, 
consistent with Study 2, and illustrated in Figure 5b, European Americans wanted to avoid 
feeling negative more than did Germans (European Americans: Mean = 1.32, SE = .05; 
Germans: Mean = 1.15, SE = .05; F [1, 180] = 7.18, p = .01, partial eta squared = .04).
We also examined group differences in actual negative affect. We conducted a univariate 
ANCOVA by Group (European Americans, Germans) for actual negative affect, controlling 
for avoided negative affect. Contrary to prediction, European Americans actually felt 
negative states less than did Germans (European Americans: Mean = −.25, SE = .04; 
Germans: Mean = −.10, SE = .04; F [1, 180] = 7.38, p = .01, partial eta squared = .04), and 
the magnitude of this difference was comparable to that of avoided negative affect.
Hypothesis 3: Does Avoided Negative Affect Mediate Cultural Differences in Expressions 
of Sympathy?
To examine whether avoided negative affect mediated the relationship between group and 
rating of the sympathy cards, we conducted a series of regression analyses as outlined by 
Baron and Kenny (1986), Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger (1998), and MacKinnon, Lockwood, 
Hoffman, West, and Sheets (2002). We first examined ratings of sympathy cards that 
focused on the negative and then ratings of sympathy cards that focused on the positive. The 
zero-order correlations between the variables in the regressions are depicted in Table 1. 
Predictors that are not explicitly mentioned below were not significant.
Rating of Negative Sympathy Cards—In Step 1, we regressed the mean rating of the 
negative sympathy cards, controlling for the mean rating of the positive sympathy cards (to 
control for overall comfort with sending sympathy cards), onto Group (path c). As already 
described by the ANCOVA above, Germans felt more comfortable sending the negative 
cards, Bc = .67, SE = .11, t(180) = 5.90, p < .001, than did Americans. Furthermore, the 
more comfortable people felt sending the positive cards (covariate), the more comfortable 
they felt sending the negative cards, B = .27, SE = .06, t(180) = 4.64, p < .001, Cohen's f2 = .
27 for the whole model. In Step 2, we regressed avoided negative affect on Group, 
controlling for actual negative affect (path a) because of observed cultural differences in 
actual negative affect. As described above, Americans wanted to avoid feeling negative 
more than did Germans, Ba = −.17, SE = .07, t(180) = −2.68, p = .01, Cohen's f2 = .05 for 
the whole model. In the third step, we regressed the mean rating of the negative cards onto 
avoided negative affect (path b) and Group (path c'). We also entered actual negative affect 
(to assess the influence of avoided negative affect above and beyond actual negative affect) 
and the mean rating of the positive cards (to control for overall comfort with cards) as 
covariates. Above and beyond group differences, the more people wanted to avoid negative 
Koopmann-Holm and Tsai Page 23
J Pers Soc Psychol. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 December 01.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
affect, the less comfortable they were sending the negative cards, Bb = −.27, SE = .13, t(177) 
= −2.12, p = .04, Cohen's f2 = .32 for the whole model (See Figure 6). Also, the more 
comfortable people felt sending the positive cards (covariate), the more comfortable they felt 
sending the negative cards, B = .29, SE = .06, t(177) = 4.91, p < .001. Furthermore, after 
entering avoided negative affect in the model, the effect of Group on the rating of the 
negative cards (path c’) was significantly reduced, Bc' = .60, SE = .12, t(177) = 5.16, p < .
001, difference in coefficients test by Freedman and Schatzkin (MacKinnon et al., 2002): 
tBc-Bc' (180) = 3.04, p = .003. Thus, as predicted, avoided negative affect partly mediated the 
cultural differences in the rating of the negative cards. Actual negative affect was not a 
significant predictor in this model, B = .26, SE = .15, t(177) = 1.76, p = .08, and therefore, it 
did not mediate differences in expressions of sympathy.
We also tested the indirect effect of group on rating of the negative cards through avoided 
negative affect, using Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping macro with 5,000 
resamples. This indirect effect was estimated to lie between .003 and .119 with 95% 
confidence interval. Because this 95% confidence interval does not include zero, the indirect 
effect is significantly different from zero at p < .05. In line with the difference in coefficients 
test reported above, this suggests that avoided negative affect can partly explain American-
German differences in the comfort rating of the negative cards.13
Rating of Positive Sympathy Cards—We also performed a multiple regression 
analysis on the mean rating of the positive sympathy cards, entering avoided negative affect, 
actual negative affect, and the mean rating of the negative cards (to control for overall 
comfort with sending sympathy cards) in one step. Although the comfort rating of the 
positive sympathy cards was significantly related to actual negative affect, B = −.58, SE = .
18, t(178) = −3.29, p = .001, as well as to the rating of the negative cards, B = .34, SE = .08, 
t(178) = 4.06, p < .001, it was not related to avoided negative affect, B = .21, SE = .16, 
t(178) = 1.29, p = .20, Cohen's f2 = .14 for the whole model. These findings did not support 
Hypothesis 3.14
Hypothesis 4: Do Frontier Values Mediate Cultural Differences in Avoided Negative Affect?
To examine whether frontier values mediated the relationship between group and avoided 
negative affect, we conducted the same series of regression analyses as outlined for the 
mediational analyses described above.
13The reverse mediation was not significant.
14Actual negative affect mediated the relationship between culture and rating of the positive sympathy cards. Controlling for the mean 
rating of the negative cards, Germans felt less comfortable sending the positive cards than did European Americans, Bc = −.52, SE = .
14, t(180) = −3.59, p < .001, Cohen's f2 = .14 for the whole model. Furthermore, controlling for avoided negative affect, Germans 
actually felt negative more than did Americans, Ba = .16, SE = .06, t(180) = 2.72, p = .01, Cohen's f2 = .05 for the whole model. 
Finally, controlling for avoided negative affect and the mean rating of the negative cards, above and beyond group differences, the 
more people actually felt negative affect, the less comfortable they were sending the positive cards, Bb = −.49, SE = .18, t(177) = 
−2.81, p = .01, Cohen's f2 = .20 for the whole model. After entering actual negative affect in the model, the effect of Group on the 
rating of the positive cards was reduced, Bc' = −.45, SE = .15, t(177) = −3.11, p = .002, difference in coefficients test by Freedman and 
Schatzkin (MacKinnon et al., 2002): tBc -Bc' (182) = −2.47, p = .01. The indirect effect of group on rating of the negative cards 
through actual negative affect was estimated to lie between −.191 and −.007 with 95% confidence interval. Thus, Americans felt more 
comfortable sending the positive cards in part because they actually felt less negative than their German counterparts (but see Study 4 
for different results).
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In Step 1, we regressed avoided negative affect, controlling for actual negative affect, onto 
Group (path c). As described above, Americans wanted to avoid feeling negative more than 
did Germans, Bc = −.17, SE = .07, t(180) = −2.68, p = .01, Cohen's f2 = .05 for the whole 
model. In Step 2, we regressed frontier values on Group (path a). As predicted, Americans 
endorsed frontier values more than did Germans, Ba = −.77, SE = .28, t(182) = −2.79, p = .
01, Cohen's f2 = .04. In the third step, we regressed avoided negative affect onto frontier 
values (path b) and group (path c'). We also entered actual negative affect as control 
variable. Above and beyond group differences, the more people endorsed frontier values, the 
more they wanted to avoid feeling negative affect, Bb = .04, SE = .02, t(179) = 2.21, p = .03, 
Cohen's f2 = .08 for the whole model. Furthermore, after entering frontier values in the 
model, the effect of Group on avoided negative affect (path c’) was significantly reduced, 
Bc' = −.14, SE = .07, t(179) = −2.16, p = .03, difference in coefficients test by Freedman and 
Schatzkin (MacKinnon et al., 2002): tBc -Bc' (181) = −2.13, p = .03. These findings suggest 
that as predicted, frontier values partly mediated the cultural differences in avoided negative 
affect.
We also tested the indirect effect of group on avoided negative affect through frontier 
values, using Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping macro with 5,000 resamples. This 
indirect effect was estimated to lie between −.079 and −.003 with 95% confidence interval. 
Because this 95% confidence interval does not include zero, the indirect effect is 
significantly different from zero at p < .05. In line with the difference in coefficients test 
reported above, this suggests that frontier values can partly explain American-German 
differences in avoided negative affect.
We also performed a multiple regression analysis on actual negative affect, entering frontier 
values and avoided negative affect in one step. Frontier spirit values were not significantly 
related to actual negative affect, B = .02, SE = .02, t(180) = 1.00, p = .32, Cohen's f2 = .01 
for the whole model. Therefore, we did not pursue the mediational analyses further.
These findings suggest that Americans want to avoid feeling negative emotions more than 
Germans do in part because they endorse frontier values more than Germans do.15
Study 3 Summary
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, Americans were less comfortable sending sympathy cards 
that focused on the negative and were more comfortable sending sympathy cards that 
focused on the positive compared to Germans. Interestingly, both groups felt more 
comfortable sending the positive cards than the negative cards, although this difference was 
more pronounced for Americans (effect size = .40) than Germans (effect size = .04). In part, 
this may be because we created cards that could be found in both cultural contexts, and 
therefore, were more moderate in their positivity and negativity than cards that are actually 
found in the two cultures.
15We conducted meditational analyses that treated each component (achievement, fitting into nature) separately, but the meditational 
analyses were only significant when the difference (achievement minus fitting into nature) was the mediator, suggesting that it is the 
relative value placed on achievement vs. unity of nature that differentiates the cultures and that accounts for differences in avoided 
negative affect.
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Consistent with Hypothesis 2 and Study 2 findings, Americans wanted to avoid feeling 
negative states more than did Germans.16 Interestingly, unlike Study 2, here we also found 
cultural differences in actual negative affect that were of similar effect size as the cultural 
differences in avoided negative affect. In part, this may reflect when we conducted the two 
studies. We conducted Study 2 in 2007, and Study 3 in 2012. In 2007, both the US and 
Germany were equally affected by the global financial crisis, whereas in 2012, Germans 
were more hurt by the European sovereign-debt crisis compared to Americans. Thus, in 
2012, the emotional climate was worse in Germany than in the US (Eddy & Jolly, 2013), 
which could explain why the group differences in actual negative affect were more 
pronounced in Study 3 than in Study 2.
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, avoided negative affect partly mediated the cultural 
differences in the comfort rating of the negative sympathy cards. However, contrary to 
Hypothesis 3, avoided negative affect was not correlated with comfort ratings of the positive 
sympathy cards. This suggests that avoided negative affect might be particularly relevant to 
negative stimuli.
Finally, consistent with Hypothesis 4, cultural differences in the desire to avoid negative 
affect were partly due to cultural differences in endorsement of specific frontier values (i.e., 
the relative importance of achievement vs. fitting into nature). While these data lend some 
support to our hypothesis, future studies are needed to determine the causal direction of this 
relationship. In addition, studies with larger sample sizes are needed to test the full model, in 
which frontier values mediate cultural differences in avoided negative affect, which in turn 
should mediate cultural differences in sympathy card ratings.
Together, our findings from Studies 1-3 suggest that cultural differences in expressions of 
sympathy are due to cultural differences in the desire to avoid negative affect. One clear 
limitation of Studies 2 and 3, however, is their correlational design. Consequently, we do not 
know the causal direction of the relationship between avoided negative affect and comfort 
ratings of the negative sympathy cards. To examine whether there is a causal relationship, in 
Studies 4a and 4b, we manipulated the degree to which people wanted to avoid negative 
affect and then examined the type of sympathy card (negative vs. positive) they preferred to 
send.
Study 4: Does Manipulating Avoided Negative Affect Alter Expressions of 
Sympathy?
According to the embodied cognition theory (Anderson, 2003), the role of the physical body 
(e.g., the way we move) has properties that affect a person's mental processes. Based on this 
theory, we hypothesized that avoided affect could be manipulated through a physical task. 
Thus, in Study 4, we manipulated avoided negative affect using an adapted version of the 
“Approach-Avoidance Task” by Rinck and Becker (2007). In our study, using a joystick, 
participants were instructed to use a joystick to either push negative images away (to 
16In Study 2 and 3 we found that Germans want to avoid feeling positive emotions more than Americans, arguing against the 
possibility that Americans are just higher in avoidance motivation.
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increase the desire to avoid negative affect) or pull negative images closer (to decrease their 
desire to avoid negative affect). In Study 4a, we examined whether the manipulation indeed 
altered reports of their desire to avoid negative affect. In Study 4b, we examined whether the 
manipulation altered the choice of negative versus positive sympathy cards. We conducted 
two separate studies (4a and 4b) on different samples to ensure that the administration of the 
manipulation check (i.e., the measures of actual and avoided affect) did not interfere with 
the dependent variable (i.e., choice of sympathy cards).
Study 4a: Manipulation Check
Hypotheses
We predicted that, across groups, participants in the “push negative away” condition would 
report wanting to avoid negative affect more than those in the “pull negative closer” 
condition. We also predicted that, across conditions, Americans would report wanting to 
avoid negative affect more than would Germans.
Method
Participants—Thirty-two American students (48.39% European American; 62.50% 
female; mean age = 18.97, SE = .35) and 30 German students (53.33% female; mean age = 
23.57, SE = .36) were randomly assigned to either the “push negative away” condition (US: 
n = 18; Germany: n = 15) or the “pull negative closer” condition (US: n = 14; Germany: n = 
15). The two cultural groups did not differ in gender distribution (χ2 [1, 62] = .53, p = .47, 
Cramer's V = .09), but Germans were significantly older than Americans, F [1, 60] = 84.54, 
p < .001, partial eta squared = .59. Therefore, we controlled for age in the analyses below 
when it emerged as significant covariate.
Task and Instruments
Joystick Task: We adapted the “Approach-Avoidance Task” (Rinck & Becker, 2007) for 
our purposes by creating two conditions. In the “push negative away” condition, when 
participants saw a negative image, they were asked to push the negative image away. The 
image then shrank physically on the screen until it vanished. When a neutral image was 
shown to the participants, they were asked to pull the image toward themselves. The image 
then grew physically on the screen until it vanished. In the “pull negative closer” condition, 
when participants saw a negative image, they were asked to pull the negative image toward 
themselves. The image then grew physically on the screen as it was pulled closer until it 
vanished. When a neutral image was shown to the participants, they were asked to push the 
image away. The image then shrank physically on the screen until it vanished. We included 
neutral images so that participants performed the same movements, regardless of condition.
The image set for the actual experiment included 33 negative images and 33 neutral images 
selected from the International Affective Picture Set (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
2008). The images were matched for content, with each set consisting of 18 photos of people 
and 15 of objects. Images from IAPS 2007 that were rated as most negative were selected, 
excluding those with overly disturbing content (e.g., mutilation) and culturally specific 
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content (e.g., Ku Klux Klan rallies). Images that were in the middle range of the valence 
scale (e.g., chair) were selected as the neutral images.
Momentary Avoided and Actual Affect: To assess whether the manipulation altered 
avoided negative affect, participants were asked how much they wanted to avoid feeling and 
how much they actually felt different states at that moment. We used the same affect words 
that we used for the AVI in Studies 2 and 3. Participants made their ratings on a 5-point 
scale ranging from 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“extremely”). Participants rated avoided affect 
before actual affect. To maintain consistency with Studies 2-3, responses were mean 
deviated within each individual by subtracting each individual's overall mean response to all 
37 of the actual (or all 37 of the avoided) affect items from the raw score for each actual (or 
avoided) item. As in Study 3, we then computed mean aggregate scores for the negative 
items for actual and avoided affect (sad, unhappy, lonely, fearful, hostile, nervous, dull, 
sleepy, and sluggish). Internal consistencies (Cronbach's alphas) for avoided and actual 
negative affect were .84 and .78 for Americans and .96 and .59 for Germans, respectively.
Procedure—In the US, participants were recruited via a website offering students research 
credit for a large introductory psychology class at a large top-tier university. In Germany, 
participants were recruited from a large top-tier university via email announcements and 
flyers offering them a Euro 7 Amazon gift certificate. The study was advertised as a 
“reaction time and consumer products study.”
American participants received all instructions and measures in English. German 
participants received all instructions and measures in German. The same translation-back 
translation technique was used as described for Studies 2 and 3 to ensure equivalence of the 
procedure and measures.
When participants arrived at the lab, they were greeted by the experimenter (an American 
female student for American participants and a German female student for German 
participants). Then they were seated in front of a computer that had a joystick attached to it, 
and asked to complete the consent form as well as to use a 5-point rating scale ranging from 
1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“very”) to answer two questions about their current mood: (1) “how 
negatively do you currently feel?” and (2) “how positively do you currently feel?”
Participants were then introduced to the task and asked to read the instructions on the 
computer screen. In the “push negative away” condition, participants were told, “For 
NEGATIVE images, PUSH the joystick AWAY from yourself. For NEUTRAL images, 
PULL the joystick TOWARD yourself.” In the “pull negative closer” condition, participants 
were told, “For NEGATIVE images, PULL the joystick TOWARD yourself. For 
NEUTRAL images, PUSH the joystick AWAY from yourself.” After 20 practice trials with 
different IAPS images, the participant started with the actual experiment, which was 
comprised of 132 trials.
Each picture was presented to the participant twice in a standard random order ([33 negative 
+ 33 neutral images] * 2 = 132 trials). However, no more than three images of the same 
valence appeared successively. At the beginning of each trial, participants saw an image of 
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medium size on the computer screen. Then, depending on whether they pushed or pulled the 
joystick, this image shrank or grew in size. Following the task, participants completed self-
report measures of actual and avoided affect. At the end of the study, participants were 
asked what they thought was the purpose of the study. Many participants thought that the 
images were intended to elicit emotion, but nobody guessed that the joystick movements 
were supposed to help increase or decrease the desire to avoid negative affect.
Data Analyses and Results
To examine whether we were successful in our random assignment, we examined the 
emotional state of our participants at the beginning of the study. We conducted a 2 (Group: 
Americans, Germans) × 2 (Condition: push negative away, pull negative closer) × 2 
(Valence: negative, positive) repeated measures ANOVA with Group and Condition as 
between-subjects factors and Valence as within-subjects factor. The only significant effect 
that emerged was for Valence. Across cultural groups and conditions, participants felt more 
positively (mean = 3.69, SE = .10) than negatively (mean = 1.94, SE = .10) at the beginning 
of the study, F [1, 56] = 104.48, p < .001, partial eta squared = .65. Because we did not find 
any differences between conditions, we assume that we were successful in our random 
assignment.
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a 2 × 2 (Group: Americans, Germans × Condition: 
Push negative away, Pull negative closer) ANCOVA for avoided negative affect, controlling 
for actual negative affect. There was a significant main effect of Condition (F [1, 57] = 5.57, 
p = .02, partial eta squared = .09) as well as a significant main effect of Group (F [1, 57] = 
15.23, p < .001, partial eta squared = .21). The Condition × Group interaction was not 
significant (F [1, 57] = 1.10, p = .30, partial eta squared = .02). As predicted, participants in 
the “push negative away” condition wanted to avoid feeling negative states more than 
participants in the “pull negative closer” condition (Push negative away: Mean = 1.05, SE 
= .10; Pull negative closer: Mean = .71, SE = .11). Furthermore, Americans wanted to avoid 
feeling negative states more than Germans did (Americans: Mean = 1.28, SE = .12; 
Germans: Mean = .47, SE = .13).
We also examined whether participants in the two conditions and groups differed in their 
actual negative affect. We conducted a 2 × 2 (Group: Americans, Germans × Condition: Pull 
negative closer, Push negative away) ANCOVA for actual negative affect, controlling for 
avoided negative affect. Participants in the two conditions did not significantly differ in how 
much they actually felt negative (Push negative away: Mean = −.49, SE = .08; Pull negative 
closer: Mean = −.56, SE = .09; F [1, 57] = .30, p = .59, partial eta squared = .01). Thus, we 
were successful in selectively manipulating avoided negative affect (and not manipulating 
actual negative affect) with this task. However, we did find a significant main effect of 
Group: across conditions, Americans actually felt more negative than Germans did 
(Americans: Mean = −.03, SE = .09; Germans: Mean = −1.02, SE = .09; F [1, 57] = 56.04, p 
< .001, partial eta squared = .50). Because there were no group differences in mood prior to 
the experiment, we infer that Americans experienced more negative affect during the task 
than did Germans.
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Next we examined whether manipulating avoided negative affect would alter how much 
participants preferred negative vs. positive sympathy cards.
Study 4b: Effects of Manipulating Avoided Negative Affect on Expressions 
of Sympathy Hypotheses
We conducted Study 4b to examine whether there was a causal relationship between the 
desire to avoid negative affect and expressions of sympathy across cultures. Using the 
experimental manipulation that we tested in Study 4a, we predicted that, across cultural 
groups, participants in the “push negative away” condition would be less likely to choose a 
negative vs. positive sympathy card than participants in the “pull negative closer” condition. 
We also predicted that, across conditions, Americans would be less likely to choose a 
negative over a positive sympathy card compared to Germans.
Method
Participants—Fifty-four American students (49.09% European American; 53.85% female; 
mean age = 19.63, SE = .34) and 48 German students (58.33% female; mean age= 23.30, SE 
= .35) participated in this study. Participants were recruited and compensated in the same 
way as in Study 4a and randomly assigned to either the “push negative away” condition 
(US: n = 28; Germany: n = 24) or the “pull negative closer” condition (US: n = 26; 
Germany: n = 24). The two cultural groups did not differ in gender (χ2 [1, 100] = .20, p = .
65, Cramer's V = .05), but Germans were significantly older than Americans, F [1, 96] = 
56.72, p < .001, partial eta squared = .37. Therefore, we controlled for age in the analyses 
below when it emerged as significant covariate.
Procedure and Instruments—American participants received all instructions and 
measures in English. German participants received all instructions and measures in German. 
The same translation-back translation procedures described above were used to ensure 
equivalence of the procedure and measures.
When participants arrived at the lab, they were greeted by the experimenter (an American 
female student for American participants and a German female student for German 
participants) and followed the same procedure as described in Study 4a. However, right after 
participants completed the joystick reaction time task, instead of completing the measure of 
actual and avoided affect as in Study 4a, participants were asked to complete the second part 
of the study, in which they had to imagine that the father of one of their acquaintances had 
just died, and that they were going to send a card to this acquaintance. Participants were then 
presented with a pair of sympathy cards (containing one negative and one positive card) on 
the computer screen. The pair was the same for both Americans and Germans. The cover of 
the negative card was beige, had leaves and other foliage, and contained the phrases, 
“Thinking of you at this difficult time;” the inside of the negative card contained the 
phrases, “No one truly comprehends the loss that you feel, the sadness that you must be 
going through. With sympathy and understanding.” The cover of the positive card was 
white, had leaves and other foliage, and contained the phrases, “As you remember your 
loved one. May the memory of the smile warm you like the sun. May the memory of the 
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laughter echo in your heart;” the inside of the positive card contained the phrases, “May the 
light of your best memories enrich all of your days. With caring thoughts and sympathy.” 
Participants were asked to choose the card they would send to their acquaintance (cards 
available upon request).
Study 4b Data Analyses and Results
To examine whether we were successful in our random assignment, we examined the 
emotional state of our participants at the beginning of the study. We conducted a 2 (Group: 
Americans, Germans) × 2 (Condition: push negative away, pull negative closer) × 2 
(Valence: negative feelings, positive feelings) repeated measures ANOVA with Group and 
Condition as between-subjects factors and valence as within-subjects factor. As in Study 4a, 
the only significant effect that emerged was for Valence. Across cultural groups and 
conditions, participants felt more positively (mean = 3.82, SE = .08) than negatively (mean 
= 1.79, SE = .08) at the beginning of the study, F [1, 96] = 221.03, p < .001, partial eta 
squared = .70. Because we did not find any differences between conditions, we assume that 
we were successful in our random assignment.
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a logistic regression analysis in which card choice (1 
= negative, 2 = positive) was regressed onto Condition, Group, and the interaction of Group 
and Condition. Because the interaction was not significant (p = .70), we removed it from the 
final analysis. We found significant main effects of Condition and Group. As predicted, 
participants in the “push negative away” condition were less likely to choose the negative 
(vs. positive) card than those in the “pull negative closer” condition, B = 1.28, SE = .50, p = .
01. Furthermore, Americans were less likely to choose the negative (vs. positive) card than 
were Germans, B = 2.43, SE = .50, p < .001, Nagelkerke R square for model = .39. The 
percentages of participants who chose the negative cards are shown in Figure 7.17
Study 4 Summary
In summary, when we experimentally altered the degree to which participants wanted to 
avoid negative affect, we also altered their likelihood of choosing a negative (vs. positive) 
sympathy card. Interestingly, Americans reported feeling more negative than Germans after 
viewing neutral and negative images during the joystick task (before the manipulation, the 
current mood did not differ between groups). It is possible that for Americans, watching 
negative images might be more distressing than for Germans, ironically because they want 
to avoid the negative more.
Because we observed cultural group differences in actual as well as avoided negative affect, 
it is possible that the group differences in choice of negative (vs. positive) sympathy card 
were due to cultural differences in actual negative affect. However, in Study 3, we found 
that the more people actually felt negative, the less comfortable they were sending a positive 
sympathy card. In this study we found that Americans actually felt more negative, but were 
more likely to choose the positive sympathy card. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the 
17We also included another pair of more indigenous sympathy cards; that is, Americans chose between a positive and negative 
American card, whereas Germans chose between a positive and negative German card. The results were the same.
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cultural difference in choice of negative (vs. positive) cards was due to actual negative affect 
rather than avoided negative affect. Regardless, across cultures, our findings support our 
prediction that the more people want to avoid negative affect, the less likely they are to 
focus on the negative (vs. positive) when expressing sympathy to another person.
General Discussion
While many scholars have examined sympathy, compassion, and other feelings of concern 
about the suffering of another person, relatively few scholars have examined how 
expressions of sympathy vary across cultures. In four studies, we demonstrate that cultures 
differ in how much they focus on the negative vs. positive when expressing sympathy to an 
acquaintance who has lost a loved one, and that these differences are due in part to the 
degree to which cultures encourage their members to avoid negative affect. More 
specifically, Americans focused less on the negative and more on the positive compared to 
their German counterparts when responding to the death of an acquaintance's family 
member in a hypothetical scenario, in part because they in general wanted to avoid negative 
affect more than Germans did. This is one of the first studies to illustrate cultural differences 
in views of negative emotion and the effects of these differences on expressions of 
sympathy.
In Study 1, we compared the emotional content of American and German sympathy cards 
and observed that American sympathy cards contained fewer negative emotion words (but 
more positive emotion words), lesser encouragement/acknowledgement of grief (but more 
encouragement/wish for something positive), and fewer dying images (but more living 
images) than did German sympathy cards. Interestingly, American cards included similar 
amounts of positive and negative words, whereas German cards included significantly more 
negative than positive words. In part, this is because in the few cases when American cards 
acknowledged the suffering of the recipient of the card, they also encouraged the person to 
focus on the positive, presumably as a way of coping with their pain. German cards, in 
contrast, simply acknowledged the suffering and grief of the recipient of the card, 
presumably because they view focusing on the negative as a way of coping with pain, and/or 
because they believe that no positive words of encouragement can reduce the pain. German 
and American baby cards did not differ in positive or negative content, raising the possibility 
that the observed cultural differences may be specific to primarily negative events, although 
future research is needed to test this hypothesis.
Sympathy cards---like other cultural products---both reflect and reinforce cultural ideas and 
practices. Because cards are consumer products (i.e., created by designers whose goal is to 
sell cards), we assume that their emotional content reflects what the designers and their 
consumers view as an appropriate response to someone who has lost a loved one. Thus, we 
assumed that Americans prefer to purchase and send sympathy cards that are less negative 
and more positive than their German counterparts. Indeed, in Study 3, Americans reported 
feeling less comfortable sending a negative card and more comfortable sending a positive 
card than did Germans, and a significantly smaller percentage of Americans than Germans 
chose at least one negative (vs. positive) card from each of the three pairs they were 
presented with. Indeed, in Study 4b, when given a choice between a more negative and a 
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more positive sympathy card, Germans were more than three times more likely to choose the 
negative (vs. positive) card than Americans. Together, these findings suggest that cultures 
vary in what they consider an appropriate way of expressing sympathy. Whereas American 
culture focuses less on the negative and more on the positive, German culture focuses more 
on the negative and less on the positive.
The Role of Avoided Negative Affect in Expressions of Sympathy—Why do 
these differences exist? We argued and found support for the hypothesis that cultural 
differences in expressions of sympathy in part reflect cultural differences in the degree to 
which people want to avoid feeling negative. Specifically, we demonstrated in Studies 3 and 
4 that the degree to which people's expressions of sympathy focus on the negative (vs. 
positive) depends in part on how much they want to avoid negative emotion: the more 
people want to avoid negative emotion, the less they focus on the negative when responding 
to another person's pain. Americans wanted to avoid negative emotion more than Germans 
did, and these differences partly explained why Americans focused on the negative less 
when expressing concern for another. Moreover, when we experimentally altered avoided 
negative affect, we observed differences in preferences for negative (vs. positive) sympathy 
card across cultures. Participants who were experimentally induced to want to avoid 
negative states more were less likely to choose the negative (vs. positive) card. Although 
previous work has demonstrated that views of negative emotion impact how people respond 
to different stimuli (e.g., whether they want to see fear photographs after watching a fear 
film; Harmon-Jones et al. (2011) and other outcomes (e.g., Andrade & Cohen, 2007; 
Grossmann & Kross, 2010; Williams et al., 1997)), this is the first work to demonstrate how 
views of negative emotion influence expressions of sympathy.
Cultural Differences in Avoided Negative Affect—This work is also the first to 
examine the possible sources of cultural differences in the desire to avoid negative states. 
We predicted that because American culture more strongly endorses “frontier” values of 
achieving one's goals, influencing others, and overcoming nature than German culture 
(Koopmann-Holm & Matsumoto, 2011; Schwartz & Ros, 1995), American culture wants to 
avoid negative affect more than German culture. The founding fathers of the United States 
fled Europe to escape religious persecution, famine, and economic hardship (e.g., Lipset, 
1997; Tucker, 1980; Wilson, 2008): in essence, they responded to their negative life 
circumstances by dreaming of a brighter future in an unknown wilderness and by pursuing 
that dream. They escaped the negative and focused on a positive future (Wilson, 2008). In 
contrast, their European counterparts remained in Europe, and to some degree accepted their 
life circumstances. In line with other scholars (e.g., Kitayama et al., 2006; Kitayama et al., 
2009; Lipset, 1997; Tucker, 1980; Turner, 1921), we predicted that the psychological 
differences between the early settlers in the United States and their counterparts who stayed 
in Europe would be evident in the values endorsed by today's European Americans and 
Germans. Indeed, we observed that Americans endorsed specific frontier values more than 
their German counterparts did, and that these differences partly mediated cultural 
differences in avoided negative affect. However, this is only one possible explanation for the 
American-German differences in avoided negative affect, and future research is needed to 
examine other possible explanations.
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As mentioned above, this is one of the few studies comparing emotional processes in two 
individualistic Western cultures. These comparisons are critical because most of the studies 
on culture and emotion have focused on European American and East Asian comparisons. 
As argued by several scholars (Koopmann-Holm & Matsumoto, 2011; Schwartz & Ros, 
1995), individualism/independence and collectivism/interdependence come in different 
forms, and different cultural value dimensions may be needed to flesh out these different 
forms. For instance, the value placed on overcoming vs. fitting into nature may be more 
relevant in American-European than in European American-East Asian comparisons.
Implications for Affect Valuation Theory—The present work expands AVT (Tsai, 
2007) to negative states. Based on AVT, we predicted that avoided negative affect would be 
distinct from actual negative affect; that cultural factors would shape avoided negative affect 
more than actual negative affect; and that avoided negative affect would alter expressions of 
sympathy above and beyond actual negative affect. We found some support for all three 
predictions. In Study 2, structural equation modeling demonstrated that in both American 
and German samples, avoided, ideal, and actual negative affect were distinct constructs, and 
that these differences held regardless of the type of negative affect (high, moderate, or low 
arousal) assessed.
AVT predicts that cultural differences in avoided negative affect would be greater than 
cultural differences in actual negative affect. We found support for this prediction as well. 
Whereas consistent cultural differences emerged in avoided negative affect across Studies 
2-4, with Americans wanting to avoid negative affect more than Germans, cultural 
differences in actual negative affect were less consistent. In Study 2, European Americans 
and Germans did not differ in their experience of HAN (e.g., nervousness) or LAN (e.g., 
dullness), but European Americans experienced less N (e.g., sadness) than did Germans. In 
Study 3, Americans reported experiencing less negative affect overall than did Germans. In 
Study 4a, although there were no cultural differences in actual negative affect at baseline, in 
response to the negative and neutral images, Americans reported experiencing more 
negative affect than Germans did.
Although it is unclear why differences in actual negative affect emerged in some cases and 
not others, it seems unlikely that these inconsistencies were due to stable cultural values. 
Indeed, in Study 3, frontier values mediated cultural differences in avoided negative affect 
but not in actual negative affect. In Tsai (2007), we suggested that although actual affect 
may be shaped by cultural factors, it is also influenced by people's temperaments, immediate 
circumstances, as well as their regulatory abilities. In Study 3, we suggested that the 
difference in actual negative affect might have been due to the different economic conditions 
in the US and Germany at the time of the study. In Study 4a, it is possible that because 
Americans wanted to avoid negative states more than did Germans, they actually 
experienced the negative images more negatively than Germans did. Future research is 
needed to test these possible explanations.
In future studies, we hope to examine how ideal positive affect and avoided negative affect 
interact, and examine the circumstances under which one is more or less important in 
predicting behavior. For instance, it is possible that avoided negative affect drives behavior 
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more in situations in which people already feel negative affective states or are anticipating 
feeling negative, whereas ideal positive affect may drive behavior more when people are in a 
neutral state.
Implications for Models of Sympathy, Compassion, and Helping—Existing 
models of helping assume that people help (or not) because they want to reduce their 
experiences of negative affect (Batson, 1981, 1983; Batson et al., 1991; Cialdini et al., 1973; 
Cialdini et al., 1987). Our findings suggest that cultures and individuals vary in their desire 
to avoid negative affect, and that these differences shape how they respond to the suffering 
of another person. Thus, our research suggests that models of helping should not just 
describe whether or not people help, but also how they help. While current models of 
helping may hold in contexts in which individuals want to avoid negative affect more, they 
may be less applicable to cultural contexts in which individuals want to avoid negative states 
less. In other words, wanting to reduce negative affect may motivate helping more in 
American than in German contexts. Future work is needed to test these ideas, with the goal 
of developing models of helping, sympathy, and compassion that are sensitive to different 
cultural ideals and norms regarding emotion.
Implications for Clinical Assessment and Treatment—Our findings also have 
important implications for assessing and treating emotional distress across cultures. For 
instance, it is possible that depression (and other disorders that are characterized by negative 
affect) is more often diagnosed in cultures that want to avoid feeling negative affect more. 
Indeed, depression is more often diagnosed in the US compared to Germany (Bromet et al., 
2011). Similarly, cultural differences in the desire to avoid negative affect may result in 
different criteria for diagnoses of depression and other affective disorders. For instance, with 
the release of the 5th edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), debate emerged about whether the DSM-
V should continue to exclude depressive symptoms due to bereavement when diagnosing a 
major depressive episode. While many American clinicians wanted to allow bereaved 
individuals to receive a diagnosis of major depression, numerous European clinicians and 
scientists felt depressive symptoms due to bereavement should not be considered in 
diagnoses of depression. As one German newspaper stated, “Trauernde [...] müssen davor 
bewahrt werden, als krank zu gelten”, or “people who are grieving [...] must not be labeled 
as ill” (Simon, 2011).
Cultural differences in avoided negative affect also have implications for the treatment of 
disorders such as depression. Clinicians may develop treatments that reflect their own 
culture's view of negative affect. For instance, Sigmund Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, 
was Austrian and thus influenced by German culture. Given the greater acceptance of 
negative emotion in German contexts, it is not surprising that a core facet of psychoanalysis 
is the notion that suppressing and avoiding negative emotions is bad and that talking about 
one's negative emotions is therapeutic (Freud, 1977). Similarly, given the greater avoidance 
of negative emotion in American contexts, it is perhaps not surprising that American 
psychiatrist Aaron Beck developed cognitive therapy (Beck, 1979) as a reaction to 
psychoanalysis, and emphasized teaching patients various “mood repair strategies” (e.g., 
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retrieving positive memories when one is sad) so that they could shift their mood from 
negative to positive. Indeed, this may explain why repressive coping, which was viewed as 
dysfunctional by Freud, actually seems functional in American contexts (Coifman, Bonanno, 
Ray, & Gross, 2007). Similarly, this may explain why antidepressants are used more often in 
the US than in Germany (e.g., Zito et al., 2008).
These findings may be particularly important for grief and trauma counseling, which, in our 
coalescing world, is often organized and provided internationally, without understanding the 
norms of the culture in need (Watters, 2010). Counselors providing assistance in other 
cultures must know whether to encourage their patients to tell their “sad heart [to] cease 
repining [because] behind the clouds ... the sun [is] still shining” or to “pass the night in 
tears, as long as [they] want to cry.”
Limitations and Current Directions—These studies have a number of limitations that 
pave the way for future research. First, it is unclear whether cultural differences in avoided 
negative affect mediate expressions of sympathy that focus on the negative and the positive, 
or just the negative. Although Study 3 suggests that it may be just the negative, in Study 4b, 
we cannot distinguish the two because participants were given a choice between a negative 
and positive card. In conducting these studies, we considered adding a “neutral” sympathy 
card; however, pilot testing revealed how difficult this was. For instance, cards that appeared 
neutral in American contexts (e.g., a card with green leaves) were perceived as positive in 
German contexts. Nevertheless, this would be an important direction to pursue in future 
research.
Second, we focused on how cultural and individual differences in avoided negative affect 
influence how people hypothetically respond to the suffering of an acquaintance; in future 
studies, it would be important to examine whether these findings generalize to other 
relationships (e.g., the suffering of a family member or friend), to actual (vs. hypothetical) 
negative events, and to how people respond to their own grief as well as how they would 
like others to respond to their own grief (e.g., which kind of sympathy cards they would like 
to receive from others). For instance, Clark (1997), in her analysis of American sympathy, 
observes that recipients of sympathy are expected to count their “blessings,” or focus on the 
positive. We predict that there would be less of this expectation in German contexts. We 
have already started to examine these questions in our current research. In the future, it 
would be also important to examine how avoided negative affect and actual negative affect 
vary across situations and across time (i.e., how people feel immediately after learning about 
another person's distress vs. weeks later). Similarly, it will be important to examine whether 
cultural differences in avoided negative affect alter expressions of other emotions such as 
anger and influence responses to other types of negative events (e.g., illness, difficulties at a 
job).
Finally, Study 3 only began to examine the causes of cultural differences in the desire to 
avoid negative affect by focusing on specific frontier values. Certainly, alternative 
explanations for American-German differences are possible and should be tested in the 
future. Furthermore, because the present work was correlational, future studies should use 
experimental methods to examine whether endorsing frontier values results in a greater 
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desire to avoid negative affect, or whether the reverse is true. Future work should also 
examine whether these differences are unique to American vs. German comparisons---
ethnographic evidence suggests that other European cultures may also be more accepting of 
negative emotions than mainstream North American culture (e.g., Gaines & Farmer, 1986; 
Grossmann & Kross, 2010). Such studies would also provide support for the notion that 
there are different forms of individualism and independence. Similarly, the present work 
focused on European Americans, but it would be interesting to examine whether other ethnic 
groups in the United States who have a similar voluntary settlement history also differ from 
their counterparts who chose not to immigrate to the United States in terms of their views of 
negative emotion and expressions of sympathy.
Conclusion—Does culture shape how people express their sympathy for another person? 
In a series of four studies, we demonstrate that American expressions of sympathy focus less 
on the negative and more on the positive than German expressions of sympathy, and that 
these differences are due in part to the degree to which Americans want to avoid negative 
affect. These studies demonstrate the importance of considering cultural views of emotion in 
current models of sympathy, compassion, and helping.
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1. 
Frequency of negative words and positive words (percentage of total words that are negative 
or positive) in American and German sympathy and baby cards in Study 1.
Koopmann-Holm and Tsai Page 44
J Pers Soc Psychol. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 December 01.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
2. 
Factor structure of ideal, actual, and avoided negative affect in Study 2. Latent variables are 
in ovals; their indicators are in rectangles; covariances are along the curved arrows; and 
error terms are e1 through g9.
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3. 
Mean-deviated ratings of actual, ideal, and avoided affect in Study 2 for (a) European 
Americans and (b) Germans. HAN = high-arousal negative; N = negative; LAN = low-
arousal negative.
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4. 
Group differences in avoided and actual negative affect in Study 2 (HAN = high-arousal 
negative; N = negative; LAN = low-arousal negative), controlling for actual and avoided 
negative affect, respectively. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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5. 
Group differences in (a) the comfort ratings of the negative and positive cards and (b) in 
avoided and actual negative affect in Study 3.
Koopmann-Holm and Tsai Page 48
J Pers Soc Psychol. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 December 01.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
6. 
Mediational model in Study 3
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7. 
Effect of Condition and Group on sympathy choice in Study 4b.
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Table 1
Zero-order correlations between the variables from the regressions (Study 3)
Country Avoided negative affect Actual negative affect Comfort rating of 
negative cards
Comfort rating 
of positive 
cards
Country
Avoided negative affect
−.19*
Actual negative affect
.19* .09
Comfort rating of negative cards
.36** −.19* .11
Comfort rating of positive cards
−.15* .02 −.19** .25**
*
p < .05
**
p < .01.
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